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This thesis addresses the development of a system to
secure appropriately an organization from some discernible
threats posed by the presence, power, and applications of
its computers. It presents a conceptual definitional frame-
work for an information system (IS) security system. This
framework consists of the system's objectives environment;
resources; components (tasks); and management. A generic
development model is established to construct a security
system within this framework. The model consists of
planning, design, and implementation (installation, testing,
and management) phases. Conclusions are drawn which present
the continuing need for such a development process within an
organization. The development model is considered suffi-
cient enough to serve as a basis for the performance of
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I. INTRODUCTION
There, are some occasion*;, though, when the most significant force in a vcar's
news is not a single individual but a process, and a widespread recognition' bv a
whole society that this process is changing the course of all other pro'cesscs. 'MkU
is why after wciching i;he ebb and flow ol events around the world. '11 MR has
decided that 19^2 is the vcar ol' the computer. It would have been possible to
Single out as Man oi' the Year one of the engineers or entrepreneurs who
masterminded this technological revolution, but no one person has clearlv
dominated those turbulent events. More important, such a selection would
obscure the main point. TIME'S Man of the Year for 1982, the greatest influence
for good or evil, is not a man at all. It is a machine: the computer. [Ref l;p. 16J
A. THE COMPUTER
This thesis was written within the context of how the computer is changing our
society and the potentials for good and evil that result from such changes. UnHke other
inventions that have been developed, the computer's impact is sometimes hard to
discern. Except in recent years, with the increasing use of microcomputers, the
computer has remained hidden behind concrete and glass enclosed walls in buildings of
varying shapes and sizes. It seemed to remain a mystery to all but a select few. One
only felt its presence in the stacks of paper that would come reaming forward at select
times. Even now, as the emphasis has shifted toward widely dispersed processing, the
full force of its power, presence, and impact remain obscured.
The essential power of a computer lies in its capabilities to process, sort, store,
and communicate vast amounts of data at great speed and accuracy. Such power
reflects the logical dimension of computers rather than their physical dimension. Unlike
many great inventions of society, like the car, the presence of the computer is more
logical than physical. As computer technology advanced from the first to the current
generation, the physical dimension of the computer decreased. This surely resulted from
advances in software and circuitry.
It has only been in recent years that the computer's power and presence have
begun to permeate our society in ever more noticeable forms. Perhaps this "macro"
permeation could be compared with Richard Nolan's "micro" or organizational level
Contagion Stage (Phase II) of Data Processing Growth. [Ref. 2:pp. 115-126J Surely,
computer technology has been initiated (Stage I). As to whether society has imposed
sufficient controls (Stage III) over this growth is debatable and beyond the scope of
this thesis. However, the issue as to whether an organization within society has
recognized the need for and imposed sufficient controls on the threats to its IS will be
addressed.
As the power, presence, and applications of computer technology increase within
our society, the issue as to whether such growth represents any threats could and
should be raised. With prior technologies, when such threats were detected and
assessed as to be material in nature, society responded with various "macro" controls
such as laws, regulatory bodies, and reporting requirements. At the "micro" level of
society, organizations have also faced the issue of a multitude of threats imposed by
technological proliferations.
This research addresses the development of a system to secure appropriately an
organization from some discernible threats posed by the presence, power, and
applications of its computers. Therefore, more than just the security of its physical
assets with economic values will be discussed. As will be addressed later, the issues are
more complex than economic valuations. It is intended that the research will provide a
generic model which could be used by an organization to address complex information
systems (IS) security issues. The model will provide a useful framework which could be
expanded, as needed, to meet organizational IS security requirements.
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The following are the thesis research objectives:
• To place the IS security issue within the broad context of society, organizations,
and individuals.
• To provide a conceptual systematic defmitional framework for IS security.
• To provide a generic development model which could be used to construct an
organization's security system within the conceptual framework.
• To establish a basic understanding of the need for IS security.
• To provide a basis for further research on and enhancements to the points
discussed in the thesis.
Four primary research questions will be addressed to accomplish the stated
research objectives.
• What is the basic importance of IS security to society, organizations, and
individuals? (Chapter 1 1)
• What is an IS security system ? (Chapter III)
• What are the needs for IS security with an organization? (Chapters IV - V)
• How can an IS security system be developed? (Chapters IV - VI)
Each of the three research questions will be addressed in the subsequent chapters.
Chapter II intends to provide background information concerning the present impact
that the computer is having on our society. Some of the threats and implications posed
by the impact will be discussed. Chapter III presents the conceptual defmitional
framework of an IS security system using a "systems approach". Chapters IV to VI
provide a development model which could be used to construct an organization's
security system within that conceptual framework. Finally, Chapter VII presents some
conclusions concerning the development model and the future of IS security.
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II. BACKGROUND
A tool is but the extension of a man's hand and a machine is but a complex tool.
He that invents a machine augments the power of a man and the well-being of
mankind. [Henry Ward Beecherj
iMen have become the tools of their tools. [Thoreau, Walden ]
A. THE ISSUE OF IS SECURITY
The issue of IS security is one that is inextricably tied to the proliferation, diverse
and wide application, interconnectivity, and significance of computers within our
society. As a result of these and several other factors, society has become more and
more dependent on the use of computers. This dependency varies as one discusses the
multitude of entities that comprise our society. The economic system, for example,
appears to be substantially more dependent on computer technology than other
systems. This is understandable when one considers that the first extensive application
of the technology involved the accounting functions of businesses.
The extent of IS dependency can vary by whatever environmental sector or entity
one wishes to discuss. Therefore, it may be useful to provide a means of classifying this
variation. Such an approach was performed at the organizational level [Ref 3:pp.
216-218]. However, it is necessary to expand this approach to present a more balanced
view concerning IS dependency.
The dependency of IS to any organization of society can be defined in two
dimensions, two states, and six levels. There are two dimensions in which to express IS
dependency. First, operational dependency occurs when the entity critically relies on
IS operational support but is not absolutely dependent on the uninterrupted
cost-effective functioning of this support to achieve either short-term or long-term
objectives. Generally, such support involves functional applications (accounting,
personnel, etc.) and management planning and control (management information
systems). In other words, an IS does not play critical role toward the achievement of
the entity's mission. IS applications tend to be internally focused systems and are used
for cost reduction or quality improvement purposes [Ref 4]. There are no interfaces
with suppliers, customers, and clients.
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Second, strategic dependency exists when an IS plays a critical role in both
operational support and toward meeting strategic needs. There is the assumption that
strategic dependency also involves operational dependency. In addition to the internal
focus of operational support, there is now a more external or environmental emphasis.
The IS plays a stronger role in the accomplishment of strategic objectives. Suppliers,
clients, and customers interact with the IS. This is intended to enhance the
organization's products or services.
One means of measuring the dependency of an IS to an organization involves an
estimation as to the time the IS could be down before essential business functions
cease. One study found that the average time period in which essential company
functions will continue following a data center failure ranged from two days for the
financial industry to 5.6 days for the insurance industry. All industries had an average
of 4.8 days. [Ref 5:p. 24] Generally, there are two underlying causes of an
organization's dependency on its IS. First, the automation of its processes on a large
scale. Second, the integration of the automated processes. Such causes involve the
extent to which an organization has automated it operational, management, and
strategic planning processes and the integration of those processes. Other things being
equal, the greater the current and anticipated extent of the automation and integration,
the greater the level of IS dependency.
At any point in time, an organization can be in two states. First, the current
state simply indicates the current level of IS dependency. Second, the planned state
represents the IS applications under development. Applications could be designed to
meet anticipated operational and/or strategic requirements.
Finally, IS dependency can be expressed in a multitude of levels. Each level is a
combination of the two dimensions (operational and strategic) and the two states
(current and planned). At any given point in time, an organization can be at only one
of six levels.
• Level 1. Currently, the organization is strategically and operationally
dependent. Applications that are under development are'expected to maintain
this posture.
• Level 2. Currently, the organization is strategically and operationally dependent
on . the IS. However, applications under development are dominated by
maintenance work, and non-strategic applications.
• Level 3. Currently, the organization is only operationally IS dependent.
However, applications under development are expected to create operational
and strategic dependency.
• Level 4. Currently, the organization is only operationally IS dependent.
Applications under development are expected to enhance operational
dependency only.
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• Level 5. Currentlv, the organizations is not operationally or strategically
denendent on its IS. However, applications under development are expected to
create an operational IS dependency.
• Level 6. Currently,, the organization is not operationally or strategicallv IS
dependent. Applications under development are not expected to create either a
strategic or operational dependency.
A full discussion of society's growing dependency on the computer would be
complex. It is a multidimensional issue which cannot be properly addressed with this
thesis. However, a limited discussion of how the computer has become infused within
our society will be presented. For it is only when we have some perception of the
impacts that computers are having, can we understand their criticalness. When such a
perception is constructed, then the subject of IS security and its development can be
discussed.
The impact of computers on our society can be expressed in four perspectives.
First, physically there has been tremendous proliferation of computers throughout our
society. Second, the logical perspective addresses the vast amount of data which is
being processed, stored, and increasingly shared. Third, computer technology is being
increasingly appUed to a wide and diverse range of organizations, processes,
professions, and functions within society. Finally, the application of computer
technology has resulted in new threats to human values which have existed on this
planet for centuries. Such threats lead us to question what we value, why we value
what we value, how to value, what threatens what we value, and how to protect and
manage what we value.
B. THE PHYSICAL PERSPECTIVE
There has been a physical proliferation of computers throughout our society. The
proliferation has been such that there are now some 30 million computers in the nation
[Ref. 6: p. 38]. Certainly a major contributing factor has been the growing popularity of
microcomputers by government, business, and the general public. Approximately 17
million are now in U. S. homes and offices [Ref 7:p. 68J. It is estimated that this
number could grow to as high as 80 million by the end of the century [Ref l:p. 16].
C. THE LOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
Author John Naisbitt [Ref 8:pp. 1-33] concludes that our Industrial Age Society
has evolved into an Information Society. At the heart of this new society is the
computer. There is a mass-production of information in the same way we used to mass
produce automobiles. Certainly, the computer is the primary producer, storer, and
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distributer of the information. However, Mr. Naisbitt makes a critical distinction
between the two societies. In the computer age, we are dealing with conceptual space
connected by electronics, rather than by physical space connected by the motorcar.
The significance of this point can be emphasized by understanding the vast amount of
data that is being processed, stored, and shared throughout our society.
The Federal Government, for example, has more than 27,000 mainframe
computers and more than 100,000 desk top computers [Ref 9:p. 52]. It accumulates,
stores, processes, and distributes vast quantities of data on a diverse range of subjects.
More than 2.5 billion records are maintained in 229 fully computerized files. [Ref 10:p.
4] Of those, 43 files contain more than 500,000 records and another 1 billion are stored
in 310 partially computerized and manual files. These records, combined with the more
than 600 data banks operated by the states and the more than 1700 data banks
operated by the cities and counties, provide governments with specific information on
virtually every citizen [Ref ll:p. 570].
There has been a tremendous growth in the interconnections of computers into
networks and the availability of commercial on-line databases. An estimated 2,400
on-line commercial databases are available for public use. [Ref 7:pp. 68-72] In a
typical month, merchants will initiate 50 million VISA credit checks to 18,014 member
banks through a high-speed authorization system then can approve payment in as little
as one second. The Traveler's Insurance Corporation spent S300 million in the past
two years to bring its 30,000 employees and 10,000 independent agents under the
umbrella of an IBM system network. Currently, the company has 35,000 terminals and
personal computers (PCs) connected to 18 mainframe computers. Each day 3.7 million
messages pass through Traveler's 2 million feet of coaxial and fiber optic cables. [Ref
7]
The electronic transfer of funds has taken on great significance in our society. We
are increasingly seeing the transfer and storage of funds being accomplished in
milliseconds via data communications circuits from computer to computer in the form
of electronic pulses, bistable circuit states, and magnetic domains. [Ref 12:p. 267] Our
economy is becoming increasingly reliant on Electronic Funds Transfers (EFT) and the
interconnections of computer systems. Traditionally, funds have been accounted for by
the accounting system then physically stored in steel and concrete vaults. The transfer
of these funds was physically accomplished by movement in armored cars, airplanes,
and railroad cars. Also, funds have taken the physical form of paper checks, securities,
notes, telegrams, letters, warrants, currency, and precious metals.
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However, there has been an increasing shift toward electronic storage and
transfer of funds. For example, a large commercial bank transfers S30 billion each day
and the U. S. Federal Reserve Wire System turns over an amount of money equal to
the national debt every four days. The four major fund transfer systems that the nation
relies on transmit S309 billion per day domestically and S600 billion per day
internationally. [Ref 12]
The national telephone system provides the largest communications network
[Ref 5 : pp. 38-39]. It is controlled almost entirely by computer and connects 100
million homes and businesses through 1 billion circuit miles of wire, cable, microwaves,
and satellites. Finally, firms like IBM are offering corporations the abiUty to share
information and applications worldwide [Ref I3:p. 2].
As indicated, vast quantities of data affecting people are being collected,
processed, stored, and communicated throughout society. It is essential that this data
isn't lost or stolen, contain no errors and omissions, and is not originated, stored,
retrieved, or communicated without proper justification. Therefore, proper security
must exist to ensure that such discrepancies can be avoided or minimized.
D. THE APPLICATIONS PERSPECTIVE
There have been a wide and diverse applications of computer technology
throughout our society. Such applications are more visible and publicized in the
business community. However, computer technology has been increasingly applied to
some significant and critical areas of society. Three such areas will be discussed.
1. The Political System
The entities of the nation's political system have been experiencing increased
applications of computer technology to their tasks. As the dependency levels of these
entities increase, so will be the need for greater protection over the information system
that are applied.
The legislative bodies of our nation have been using various IS to support
their operations. The Congress uses a system called LEGIS to record, store, and
provide prompt computer response to inquiries about the current status of all bills and
resolutions. [Ref 11 :p. 606] The SOPAD system enables members to receive
up-to-the-minute summary of proceedings and debates taking place on the floors of the
House and Senate. Also, FAPRS (Federal Assistance Program Retrieval System) helps
members to determine what federal grants and loans can be used by their constituents.
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State legislatures, such as those in New York, Washington, Florida, Pennsylvania,
Hawaii, and North Carolina, make effective use of computers to index, store, process,
and retrieve statutory material; draft bills; prepare roll-call vote reports; provide census
population data for planning purposes; address mailing labels; and provide other
information and services to legislators and their staffs.
Computer technology has also been applied to the Judicial System. An
advanced computer-aided transcription (CAT) technology has been used by courts in
Chicago, Phoenix, and Detroit. [Ref 14:pp. 1 & 22] It serves to translate testimony in
real-time and display it on video monitors in courtrooms. Also, this on-line CAT
system provides attorneys with the ability to search for and retrieve specific portions of
transcripts and provides fully edited transcripts within minutes after a court session.
CAT is of great benefit in those instances when witnesses or counsel do not
articulate well enough to be understood by all parties. The real-time transcription
enables deaf attorneys and litigants to read testimony they could not hear. The most
significant advantage for attorneys is the ability to receive daily transcripts on
computer disks, ready for indexing and cross-referencing on microcomputers. As a
result, information is quickly accessible and more easily researched using the CAT.
Additional application to the judicial system may result. There will eventually
be automated statute and precedent research. Also, telecommunications will enable the
transmission of trial information to the attorney's office the instant it has been
converted to text. This would permit greater time to perform research for subsequent
court sessions.
2. Journalism
Journalists have found the computer an effective tool for discovering
information which would have "... remained buried like a treasure crest at the bottom
of the sea". Computer technology permits archival scanning that once required
exhaustive card-catalog searches and high-speed analysis of myriad numbers until the
machine produces a revelatory pattern. Several examples follow. [Ref 15 :p. 56]
The computer was used to analyze 30,000 low-interest mortgages issued by a
mortgage finance corporation. The journalists matched mortgage issue dates with the
bond issue that financed them. These helped expose a "secret fund" that apparently was
used to give out loans to politically connected people. Criminal indictments resulted
from the investigation.
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One reporter heard that undefended indigents were being jailed for months
because they could not pay S100-to-S300 fines for offenses like jaywalking. Records of
899 inmates were fed through a computer. As a result of this analysis, the courts freed
hundreds of inmates, threw out 20,000 orders for jail commitment and told the county
to provide attorneys for poor defendents. It was estimated that without the computer
analysis, the work would have required up to a year of research rather than six weeks.
In 1979, a newspaper scanned with a computer all 2 million of a county
government's property-tax assessments to discover inequities. In 1984, another
newspaper used the computer to examine every state-awarded highway contract in the
area and all major county sewer contracts over eleven years to discover that five
favored firms collected 86% of the awards. The application of computers in journalism
will continue to be significant as more and more public data are processed using
computers.
Therefore, the issue of IS security becomes significant for two reasons. First,
there needs to be a means of determining what is public information and procedures
established for accessing it. Second, the integrity of stored public information needs to
be maintained- to ensure that what may be publicly stored and reported is valid. [Ref.
15]
3. Monitoring, Control, and Decision Making
The public and private sectors have been increasingly using computers to
monitor, control, and decide on a variety of activities. Such activities include such
areas as weather forecasting, national defense, work performance, medical care, and the
stock market. Therefore, the protection of the IS designed for such functions is
becoming increasingly important.
The government and industry have been increasingly using computer
technology to monitor and control a variety of activities. The Internal Revenue Service
has applied computers to monitor the returns of individual and corporate taxpayers.
[Ref ll:p 607] The reports of interest paid by banks to individuals can be compared
against income reported by the taxpayer. Also, computers are used to select randomly
and make preliminary audits of tax returns.
Environmental control has been another area of application. U. S.
governmental agencies processing environmental data with the assistance of computers
include the Air Pollution Control Office and the Water Quality Office of the
Environmental Protection Agency, the National Center for Health Statistics, the U. S.
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Geological Survey, and the Department of Agriculture. At the state and local
governmental levels, computers are being used to evaluate and control the levels of
pollution. A significant result o[ the application of computer technology to
meteorology has been the ability to predict hurricane paths. [Ref. 16: pp. 3 & 5] It is
now possible for meteorologists to predict fairly accurately the circuitous paths
hurricanes mil follow and thus reduce the potential damage and loss of human life.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has developed the World Wide Military
Command and Control System for U. S. military commanders from the President on
down. [Ref il:pp. 277-278] This system links 35 large . computers at 26 command
posts around the world. The computers at the North American Air Defense Command
accept, store, and constantly update masses of data from worldwide radar installations.
The system can also track every humanly produced object in earth orbit. On the
civilian side, millions of aircraft flights are monitored across the nation each year by
the computers of the Federal Aviation Administration 's (FAA) Air Traffic Control
System.
Computers are being used to monitor the work performance of the people
who use them. [Ref I7:p. 46] It is estimated that 13 million Americans use computer
terminals in their work, and about one-third of them are being monitored by the
computer as they work. The computer is programmed not only to process information
from each employee's terminal but also to measure, record, and tabulate dozens of
details about how efficiently the worker is utilizing the system. Airline-reservation
computers, for example, closely measure how long individual clerks take to handle each
customer, and the amount of time the employee spends between calls. Any idle time is
recorded, as well as lunch hours, coffee breaks, and even trips to the bathroom.
Computer technology has made significant contributions to the quality of
medical care. In some hospitals, for example, patients are able to sit down at a
computer terminal before meeting a doctor to provide their medical histories and to
receive information about the hospital. [Ref 18:pp. 47-48] The computer interviews can
be done in several foreign languages, as well as English, with a doctor receiving an
instantaneous translation. Information on some ailments, such as stroke and blood
disease, has been computerized within the hospital for doctors' consultation. Currently,
computers have the capability of detecting and monitoring ocular and cerebral ailments
such as glaucoma and brain tumors. Some hospitals program computers not only to
remind the pharmacy department to prepare prescriptions but also to alert nurses to
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give the proper dosage at the right time. A patient's medical history can be updated
with the use of terminals located throughout the hospital. More broadly, computers
permit the patient to be able to receive a health profile at far less cost than previously
possible; and by systematizing information about the patient, reduce his or her hospital
stay and pare both institutional and patient cost.
Another significant accomplishment in the health care field has been the
establishment of medical detecting and advising systems. [Ref. 19] Such systems are
accessible to hospitals located throughout the nation. As patient's are examined,
medication orders and test results are entered into the system. The system contains
data relative to various symptoms and the advised medications. Also, the patient's
medical history is contained within the system's data. The history includes the patient's
record of examinations; history of ailments; the doctor's and nurse's notes; data from
monitoring equipment, such as electrocardiograms; and, from laboratory test machines,
such as an automatic blood analyzer or X-Ray machine. As data is input, the system
analyzes it and immediately begins asking for more information, suggesting tests,
offering a diagnosis or reacting to the doctor's treatment plan by warning of drug
interaction, patient allergies or other potential problems. In one system, Control Data
Corporation's Health Evaluation through Logical Processing (HELP), the doctor
doesn't have to take the computer's advice. However, the reason for this must be
explained in the patient's record by the doctor. HELP acts as a flexible checklist for
doctors. The system is programmed to react to the changing conditions of the patient
as a disease progresses or as new laboratory tests or other information becomes
available.
Finally, computers are playing an increasingly significant role in the buying
and selling of stock. First, the New York Stock Exchange uses 13 computers to
support minute-to-minute floor trading. [Ref 20:p. lOA ] It is estimated that if three of
the computers fail, stock trading would cease. Second, large investors are using
computers to monitor stock prices and to sell or buy automatically when they reach a
particular point. [Ref 21:pp. IB - 2B] This " program selling " is dominated by a few
major Wall Street brokerages. Third, the nation's stock exchanges have applied
computer technology to enhance their abilities to monitor and control illegal activities
related to stock trading. [Ref 22:p. 46] The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the
American Stock Exchange, and the Over-the-Counter NAS-DAQ Systems employ
comprehensive computer systems to monitor unusual stock trading. In 1985, the NYSE
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instituted an audit trail allowing it to track the buyers and sellers involved in each
trade.
E. THE VALUE PERSPECTIVE
Ultimately, the question of values and the threats to and the limitations on those
values imposed by the increasing use of computer technology must be addressed.
Traditionally, such issues tended to focus more strongly upon the physical and
application perspectives of computers. The security issues involved protecting
computer systems as assets with economic value. Also, applications should contain
sufficient controls to prevent malfunction, error, damage, destruction, or fraud which
could result in the loss of economic and human values.
However, as previously discussed, the power of the computer system is no longer
defined by its size and limited applications. The logical power of a computer in terms
of processing, storage, and communications has reached a point of dominance. As a
result, the issues of what we value as a society and the threats to those values take on
a broader context.
1. Human Privacy, Freedoms, and Power
First, human privacy, freedoms, and power are threatened by the increasing
mass processing, storage, and communication of information. Vast amounts of
information on individuals are stored in a number of private data banks. [Ref 23:p.
104] The data is sold to businesses and individuals for a designated price. Computer
"blacklists" of consumer information are sometimes used as a basis for denying housing
and credit to consumers on the list.
Credit bureaus such as TRW Information Services and Equifax, Inc. have
long relied on huge data banks of mainframe computers to provide consumer credit
records for banks, department stores, finance companies, and employers. Each working
day, TRW's machines handle an average of 255,000 requests culling information from a
massive data base that contains detailed records of the bill-paying habits of 133 million
people.
Our society established controls in the form of laws. Under the Federal
Privacy Act of 1974, for example, the Census Bureau, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), and other government departments must notify citizens before releasing
information about them to another agency. Consumers also have the right to stop
credit bureaus from dispensing false or misleading data. However, the regulations
governing the new private blacklists are murky and contradictory, [Ref 23]
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Also, a congressional investigation concluded that advances in technology are
eroding the Federal Government's ability to ensure privacy of personal information
stored in government computers [Ref 24:pp. 1 & 14]. The Privacy Act of 1974 was
developea under certain technical and social conditions. [Ref 25:p. 60] Batch
processing was dominant in 1974 and government agencies and large businesses were
the major users of computers. Also, the telecommunications industry was regulated and
highly structured. Its development and functioning were mainly separate from
computer systems.
The technological changes that have taken place over the last 12 years were
not provided for in the act. For example, there has been an increase in modem (the
device used to link a computer with a network) capabilities nationwide. An estimate by
the U. S. National Security Agency (NSA) indicated that all the modems purchased in
the U. S. in 1972 could together transmit 600,000 characters per second. However, in
1984, a sufficient number of modems were purchased to transmit 220 million characters
per second. With the increase in quantity of transmission has come an increase in
speed. The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) estimates that with the increased
communications capacity made possible by fiber-optics, it is possible to transmit at a
rate of 100 average-length pages per second. This capability could permit the creation
of centralized libraries with universal access. [Ref 25]
The growth of computer technology challenges the balances of power within
our society. These balances exist between man and machine as well as between men
who apply computer technology. The balance of power between man and machines
essentially involves two issues. First, the extent to which man permits computers to
monitor and control human and non-human activities such as in work performance
monitoring. Second, the extent to which man permits computers to actually decide
critical questions without human intervention. This second issue has great relevance in
the areas of health, economics, and national defense.
When computer technology is appUed to various aspects within our society it
sometimes alters or threatens to alter the existing power balances. The machine can be
used as an instrument for shifting the balance of power beyond safe limits. For
example, the governor of the state of New Hampshire reorganized the state's
computerized financial management system. [Ref 26:p. 70] He established an integrated
financial management system which reported state budgetary, revenue, and expenditure
information. As governor, he freely accessed the system to obtain required information.
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However, the issue of the availability of the data was raised by the state legislature.
The governor attempted to retain control over who could access the stored data. This
was perceived as an attempt to try to shift control from the legislature to the
governor's office. However, the governor did agree to issue a password to one
legislative official under certain limitations. Only limited information from the system
could be accessed by the legislature. The state's computer contains revenue,
expenditure, budgetary, and operational information. Such information provides a basis
for managing the government; assessing its performance; and making decisions in these
areas. If the legislature's access to such information is narrowly restricted by the
governor, then it may not be able to properly perform its duties. Such duties include
assessing the state's financial and operational performances and making sound
decisions that it is constitutionally empowered to make. At the time of this writing, the
matter has not been resolved. However, this case illustrates the poUtical implications
that could result from the application of computer technology in an organization.
2. Human Vulnerability
Society is becoming increasingly vulnerable to computer system destruction,
damage, malfunctions, errors, misuse, and fraud. As previously indicated, this results
from the expanded proliferation, power, and applications of computer technology
within the society. It is estimated that the overall losses to U. S. businesses from
computer crime are from SlOO million to S3 billion annually [Ref 27:p. 1-1-4]. In the
public sector, government computer disorders have been estimated to result in annual
losses of $30 billion to the American taxpayer [Ref 9].
The vulnerability of our society can also be expressed from an operational
perspective. Computer systems eventually become integrated with the other systems of
an organization and society. As discussed earlier, this integration could reach a point
where organizations become dependent to varying degrees on the computer to
accomplish operational and strategic objectives. As the degree of integration increases,
the levels of operational and strategic dependency of the organization also increase.
Therefore, the various systems within our society and organizations become
increasingly vulnerable to computer destruction, modification, disclosure, and denial of
service.
The scope of this vulnerability could extend from a single individual to the
entire human race. Certainly one system which has global significance is our national
security system. Its existence and readiness secures mankind from Armageddon. This
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system has become increasingly dependent upon computer technology to maintain that
readiness. A clearer picture can be presented of the vulnerability issue when one
considers that a study revealed that only 30 out of about 17.000 DOD computers
surveyed met minimum standards for protection [Ref. 28:p. 39].
F. CONCLUSIONS
It is hoped that this chapter offered some insight into the broad or "macro"
perspective of computers and the need for some degree of control over them in various
circumstances. Due to the scope of this thesis, it was not possible to explore the
presented issues in any greater depth. However, it is within this "macro" perspective
that an IS security system must be developed to meet threats at both the "macro" and
"micro" or organizational levels. As society's dependency on computer technology has
increased, it has responded with controls in the form o[ laws, regulations, and
regulatory bodies to counter the threats. So too must individual organizations respond
with controls as its level of dependency and threats rise. An orderly process should be
followed by organizations to assess its security needs and to select appropriate controls
to meet those needs. The development of such a process is the subject of this thesis.
The following chapter will address the definition of an IS and an IS security system.
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!II. THE SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE
The whole is more than the sum of its parts. [Aristotle]
A. WHAT IS A " SYSTEM " ?
1. System Definition
Generically, a system can be defined as a set of parts coordinated to
accomplish a set of goals. It is possible to conceive o[ a hierarchy of systems which
encompass the entire universe. Man has developed political, economic, technological,
social, and legal systems to enable him to survive, coexist, and prosper. Within each of
these systems, other systems (organizations) were formed over time through the
combination of people, resources (time, currency, energy, materials, equipment, space,
information, and technology), procedures, structure, and goals. These organizational
systems are embedded within the universal system. There are five basic considerations
that one must keep in mind when thinking about the meaning of a system. [Ref 29:pp.
29-47]
First, each system must have total objectives and means to measure the
performance of the whole system. A distinction needs to be made between a system's
stated objectives and the real objectives. Some objectives may be publicly stated to
accommodate groups and win support. Such a situation could arise to obtain a larger
budget, v-'in customers, or obtain investment funds. A means of separating real and
stated objectives is to determine whether the system will knowingly sacrifice other goals
in order to attain the stated objective. Once measures of performance are developed to
assess the accomplishment of the objectives, a distinction should also be drawn
between stated and real measures of performance. For example, a student in class often
comes to think of his or her objective as the attaining of as high a grade as possible.
The measure of performance becomes the letter grade obtained when the course is
completed. Such a high grade could be achieved at the sacrifice of a real understanding
of the content of the course. The high grade is sought because he or she believes that
high grades will lead to scholarships and other opportunities in the future. The
student's stated purpose is to learn but his or her real measure of performance is the
grade.
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Second, the system's environment needs to be considered. The environment
lies "outside" the boundaries of the system. Physical boundaries do not define what is
"inside" and "outside" the system. The environment represents constraints on the
system. The system can do relatively little about the environment's characteristics or its
behavior. In effect, the environment is beyond the control of the system but it is also
something that partly determines how the system performs. For example, if the system
is operating in a very cold climate, then the equipment must be designed and protected
to withstand various kinds of severe temperature changes. An important aspect of the
environment of the system is the "requirement schedule". For an industrial firm, this
consists of the sales demands. These demands could be somewhat influenced by means
of advertising, pricing, and the like. But to the extent that demand for the
organization's products is determined by individual people outside who are the
customers of the firm, then the demand lies in the environment of the system.
Internal resources comprise the third relevant element of a system. Resources
represent the things the system can change and use to its advantage. Such resources
include people, currency, energy, materials, space, time, information, technology, and
equipment.
Fourth, a system consists of components and their relevant goals, activities,
and measures of performance. Generally, organizations are divided into departments,
divisions, offices, and groups of individuals. These represent the structures that will
perform the components (tasks). They may not represent the real components of the
system but rather the stated ones. A department or unit may not perform just one task
such as production. Rather it may perform several tasks. Therefore, there needs to be
a rational breakdown of the tasks the system must perform. An analysis of the tasks
will permit an estimate of the worth of an activity for the total system. If a department
or other organizational subdivisional is associated with several larger tasks, it may be
impossible to distinguish its real contribution. It must be determined if the departments
and other subdivisions arc relevant to the real components of the system. The
components (tasks) whose measures of^ performance are truly related to the measures
of perforr''ance of the overall system must be discovered.
Fifth, system management generates plans for the system - goals.
environment, resources, and components. It sets the component goals, allocates the
resources, and controls the system's performance. [Ref 29:pp. 29-47]
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2. System Thinking
The five elements just discussed must satisfy thie following three conditions.
[Ref. 30:pp. 2-3]
• The behavior of the whole is affected by the behavior of each of the five
elements.
• There is an interdependency between the behavior of the elements and their
effects on the whole system.
• Regardless of how the subgroups of the elements are formed, each has an effect
on the behavior of the whole and none has an independent effect on it.
Therefore, a system is a whole entity that cannot be divided into independent parts.
Two of a system's most important properties are derived from this statement:
• Each part or element of a system has properties that it loses when separated
from tne system.
• Every system has some properties - its essential ones - that none of the parts
have alone.
The essential properties of a system taken as a whole result from the interactions of its
parts or elements, not actions taken separately. As a result, when a system is taken
apart (analysis) it loses its essential properties. Due to this critical fact, a system is a
whole that cannot be understood by analysis. [Ref 30:pp. 2-3]
Therefore, a method other than just analysis is required for understanding the
behavior and properties of systems. System thinking involves the reversal of the the
three-stages of Machine Age thinking : (1) decomposition of that which is to be
explained, (2) explanation of the behavior or properties of each part separately, and (3)
aggregating these explanations into an explanation of the whole. Analysis (taking
thmgs apart) is the critical factor in the process. Synthesis (putting things together) is
used as a means of putting together behaviors and properties in a meaningful way.
System thinking views these two means as inseparable. [Ref 30]
System thinking is a process involving the following:
• Identification of a whole of which the thing to be explained is a part.
• Explanation of the behavior or properties of the whole.
• Explanation of the behavior or properties of the thing to be explained in terms
of Its role(s) or function(s) within its whole.
Using this approach, synthesis precedes analysis.
In analytical thinking, the thing to be explained is regarded as a whole to be
taken apart. Synthetic thinking regards the thing to be e.xplained as a part of a
containing whole. In effect, analysis focuses on structure and reveals how things work.
Synthesis concentrates on function by revealing why things operate as they do. As a
result, analysis yields knowledge and synthesis yields understanding.
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B. WHAT IS AN INFORMATION SYSTEM (IS) ?
An IS is conventionally defined as information resources plus all users of the
information. [Ref 31:p. 2] Information resources consist of all the physical and logical
components of the IS such as computers, programs, analysts, programmers, operators,
managers, data, operating systems, and communications links. The physical, logical,
and human elements of the IS can be structured in the "system" conceptual framework,
previously discussed. A more comprehensive and structured definition will prove useful
for formulating and implementing an IS security system.
1. IS Objectives
Information is the basic requirement of IS users. It can be delivered to users
in physical (hardcopy) and logical (terminal display and voice outputs) forms.
Generally, users have specifications for receiving the information. These specifications
involve the information format; timeliness; cost; storage; availability; reliability;
volume; distribution; and protection.
The prime objective of the IS is to meet user requirements (demands) for
information relative to their specifications. The measures of performance for the IS
involve criteria to assess the efTectiveness and efficiency of the IS in satisfying user
demands. If the IS plays a strategic role in the accomplishment of the organization's
objectives, then such measures will also include criteria for assessing the performance
of the users, or their organizational units using the IS for accomplishing their
organizational missions. [Ref. 32:pp. 57-58]
2. Tlie IS Environment
The IS environment consists of four elements. First, there is the environment
outside the organization within which the IS is embedded. This environment is
relevant to the IS since it produces the technology, products, and services which are
utilized by the IS to perform its mission Also, this environment is responsible for
producing the laws, regulations, and standards which affect the behavior of the IS in
performing its activities.
Second, the top management of the organization provides the funding,
direction, and commitment needed to support the IS. It affects the behavior of the IS
by controlling the intensity levels of the three variables. Such intensity could range
from high to low depending on the organization's level of dependency on the IS. A
high level of dependency would require a high level of funding, commitment, and
direction in terms of the products and performance it requires from the IS.
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A third factor is the line, support, and general management components
(tasks) and structures of the organization. The IS is responsible for providing
information to these comiponents (tasks) and the structures that are formed to provide
such components (tasks). Organizational components (tasks) would include line (e.g.,
production, marketing, and engineering); support (e.g., accounting, administration, and
purchasing); and general management (e.g., strategic planning, capital budgeting). The
structures formed to perform such tasks include departments, divisions, sections,
groups, staffs, and offices.
Fourth, the IS has various types of users of its products, services, and
resources. Such users are people within and outside (e.g., suppliers, customers, and
dealers) the organization who are authorized to receive information produced by the IS
and to utilize its resources. Top management personnel are included as those who
receive IS products and services as well as utilize IS resources. Consumers are users
who are authorized to receive IS products and services and to utilize the IS resources.
Owners are users who have exclusive rights and use over IS products, services, and
resources. IS resources (hardware and software) are generally owned by the IS.
Information, however, is generally owned by the organizational components (tasks)
and structures (e.g., accounting, marketing, production). In a decentralized or
distributed IS configuration, resources could be owned by the consumers. Custodians
are users who are responsible for IS products and resources while they are under their
possession. For example, service bureaus and time-sharing services operate on a
third-party contractual basis. [Ref 33:p. 3A-5]
3. IS Resources
There are seven types of IS resources. First, IS facilities include physical plant
and supporting equipment and utilities. Second, IS technology can be either batch or
on-line. Batch technology involves the processing of a number of similar input items
which are grouped for processing during the same machine run. There is no interaction
between the users and the job while it is processing. On-line technology involves the
processing of data as it is generated. Interaction between the user and the job while it
is running can take place. Third, hardware consists oi' units such as central processing
units; magnetic storage devices; input/ output devices; communication controllers;
modems; terminal concentrators; digital switches; cryptographic devices; and
multiplexors. A fourth IS resource is software. Software involves operating systems;
database management systems; communications control software; and appUcations
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software. Fifth, the data resource can be divided into various groups such as
accounting, proprietary, and personal information. Sixth, people are the individuals
who develop, operate, and manage the IS. Finally, procedures are the standards, rules,
and policies established to develop, operate, and manage the IS.
4. IS Components
There are twelve IS components (tasks). Some or all of the IS resources are
combined to construct each of the twelve com^ponents (tasks). In other words, the data
entry component (task) could involve hardware (terminals); people (data entry
personnel); procedures (data entry manual or users manual); and data (invoices). The
combination of these resources forms a component or IS task. Such components
(tasks) involve data origination, collection, preparation, and authorization; data input;
data processing; data output; output distribution; storage cS: retrieval; communications;
data management; hardware operations; system programming; application program
maintenance; and system development. A organization may have all or part of these
components (tasks). For example, a centralized IS configuration may not have a
communications component (task) if all input documents are mailed or delivered to the
IS for processing. Generally, the higher the level of IS dependency, the more of these
components (tasks) an IS will contain.
5. IS Management
There are several aspects to the management of an IS. First, the mission of
the IS needs to be established. This mission should be a reflection of the information
needs of its environment. Second, a short range (1 year or less), intermediate range (1
to 5 years), and long range (greater than 5 years) strategy needs to be formulated to
accomplish the designated mission. Such a strategy consists of overall and component
objectives; measures of performance; appHcation developments; policies; procedures;
processes; and rules. It is through such a strategy that the people within the
organization perform the activities needed to fulflU the mission.
Third, IS resources will need to be allocated to components to develop and
maintain classes of IS applications. These classes of applications include transaction
processing systems (TPS); management information systems (MIS); decision support
systems (DSS); office automation systems (OAS); strategic information systems (SIS);
and communication systems (local area networks and wide area networks).
An application can be defined in two ways. One way involves an
organization's structural components (tasks). Such appUcations support general
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management, line, and support components (tasks). The other way to defme an
application is in terms of its application to various fields of study such as medicine,
science, military, education, and law. The application systems within the classes are
developed and maintained over time to fulfill user requirements.
Fourth, resources, components, and management activities need to be
structured and deployed. There are three configurations that are generally utilized. [Ref
34:p. 16] A centralized configuration entails all data processing and storage capabilities
at one geographic location, possibly with noninteUigent (non-data editing or local
storage capabilities) terminals, either batch or interactive on-line, at other geographic
locations. On the other hand, independent components and resources in different
geographic locations which do not communicate are considered a decentralized
configuration. A distributed configuration entails resources, components, and
management in different geographic locations which communicate and process
applications cooperatively.
C. WHAT IS AN IS SECURITY SYSTEM ?
1. Security System Objectives
The basic objective of the IS security system is to provide protection for the
organization's IS physical (facilities, hardware, and procedures), logical (software and
data), and human (people) assets. IS assets are to be protected from a variety of
threats which could cause modification, destruction, disclosure, and denial of service of
the assets. The measures of performance for the security system involves how
effectively and efficiently the assets are protected from the threats which could cause
such adverse impacts.
2. The Security Environment
The IS security system's environment consists of three factors. First, there is
the environment outside the organization. This environment is relevant to the security
system since it produces the technology, products, and services which are used by the
security system. It also produces the laws, regulations, and standards which affect its
behavior and objectives.
Second, the top management of the organization provides funding, direction,
and commitment which is needed to support the security system. It aflects the behavior
of the security system by varying the intensity of these three variables.
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Third, the IS security system is embedded within the IS of an organization.
Although the security system operationally functions within the IS, it is separately
managed by the security staff.
3. Security Resource.s
The security system's resources are controls in the form of security hardware,
software, people, procedures, and data. The security controls such as security manuals;
guards; separation of duties; passwords; hardware terminal locking; and restricted
dial-up access are applied to IS resources. The controls provide the means of linkmg or
operationally embedding the security system within the IS.
4. Security Components
There are six components (tasks) of the security system. First, the avoidance
component (task) seeks to avoid threats to assets by removing the potential threat or
by eliminating or moving assets away from potential threats. An example would
involve removing a sensitive data file from on-line access during periods of time when
potential threats are present. This situation could arise during hardware maintenance
or time-sharing by unknown individuals.
Second, the deterrence component (task) involves activities to reduce the
threat to assets by reducing the vulnerability of the assets to loss. An example would
include Lbeling all copies of computer programs, data, computer equipment
documentation, and storage media with warning labels. Such a label could read
"Unauthorized modification, destruction, disclosure, taking, or use is punishable by
law".
Third, the prevention component (task) involves reducing the frequency with
which causes of threats occur. Examples include segregation of duties; passwords;
authorizations; and standardization.
Fourth, the detection component (task) involves the notice of an attempted or
actual threat. Examples include control logs; fire detection; hardware checks; operator
logs; and operating system checks.
Finally, the recovery and correction components (tasks) involve activities
which support the restoration from and replacement of loss. Examples of such
activities involve the development of contingency plans; off-site back-up; on-site
backup; and discrepancy reports. [Ref. 12:pp. 299-309]
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5. Security System Management.
There are several aspects to the management of an IS security system. First,
the management of the system is responsible for the establishment of the mission or
objectives of the security system. This mission or objective(s) should be a reflection of
the security requirements of the security system's environment.
Second, short range, intermediate range, and long range strategies need to be
formulated to accomplish the designated mission. Strategies consist of overall system
and component objectives; measures of performance; policies; procedures; processes;
rules; standards; budgets; and reviews and evaluations. It is through such strategies
that people within the organization perform the activities needed to accomplish the
mission.
Third, appropriate security resources (controls) should be allocated to IS
resources to ensure their protection. Such controls take the form of devices,
procedures, and people.
Finally, security system resources (controls), components (tasks), and
management should be structured and deployed within the organization. There are two
appropriate configurations. One involves a centralized concentration of security
resources (controls), components, and management. This would reflect a centralized IS
configuration. The other approach involves a more decentralized structure and
deployment of security resources (controls), components (tasks), and management.
Such a configuration would reflect a decentralized or distributed IS configuration.
D. WHAT IS THE IS SECURITY SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT MODEL ?
A major objective of this thesis is to provide a conceptual systematic framework
for defining IS security. This chapter defined an IS security system in terms of its
objectives: environment; components (tasks); resources (controls); and management.
The other major objective is to provide a generic development model that could
be used by an organization to construct a security system within this defined
framework. Chapters IV to VI are intended to provide an orderly process for
constructing and maintaining the security system. The development model consists of
three phases. Each phase will produce various parts of the security system.
The planning phase will address the development of a security system
development plan; a definition of the responsibilities for IS security within the
organization; the establishment of security baseline requirements; the classification of
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IS applications, data, and transactions; and the establishment of a security policy for
the organization. The planning phase will produce the security system objectives and
environment parts of the security system framework.
The design phase is responsible for producing the security resources part of the
security system framework. Security resources are the controls which should be applied
to the IS resources to provide the required level of security based on the classification
performed during the planning process. The security controls effectively link the IS
with the IS security system.
Finally, the implementation phase will involve the testing of selected security
controls; the installation of the controls; and the development of a management
structure and components (tasks) to manage the security system to ensure that the
security objectives are accomplished. This phase will produce the components (tasks)
and management parts of the security system framework.
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IV. THE PLANNING PHASE
I like the dreams of the future better than the histor\' of the past. [Thomas
Jefferson, Statesman]
I never think of the future, it comes soon enough. [Albert Einstein, Scientist]
A. INTRODUCTION
There are five steps of the planning phase of the IS security system development
process. First, an organizational security system development group will need to be
formed. This group will have prime responsibility for formulating security objectives
and priorities. Also, they are responsible for managing the planning, design, and
implementation phases of the development process. Second, the responsibilities for IS
security will be defined for the organization's top management, line management, and
the IS security staff Third, IS security policy will be formulated. This policy will
consist of both security objectives and security priorities. Fourth, the IS security
environment will be both defined and analyzed. The purpose of this analysis is to
establish the organization's baseline security requirements. Finally, a security
classification program will be established. The purpose of this program will be to
classify IS applications, data, and transactions as to their criticalness and sensitivity.
This will provide a basis for the allocation of security controls during the subsequent
design phase. The planning phase will also begm the accumulation of relevant security
information in an IS security database. Once the information is fully accumulated at
the end of the development process, the database will provide a means of maintaining
and managing the developed security system.
B. SECURITY SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT GROUP
1. Development Group Members
There are two approaches for staffing the development group. The first
approach involves forming a group consisting o[ representatives from functions that
relate to IS security. This group could work on a full-time basis or they could allocate
limited number of hours per week to the development effort. Such functions include IS
operations; hardware maintenance; systems programming maintenance; systems
34
development; quality control; IS standards; application programming; users; database
administration; facilities management; general security department; the legal stall;
personnel department; and the fire department.
Each representative must function in the group in isolation from
representatives of all other functions requiring security. This enables a separation of
responsibilities and maintains the principle of privilege or need to know. An example
would illustrate the point. It would be unwise to have a programmer studying
operations security. The separation of responsibility is a significant organizational
control. Each assigned representative must be able to devote significant time to the
group. Such an undertaking requires fixed schedules of work for the group and
well-planned and coordinated meetings, especially to maintain the necessary separation
of responsibilities. To accomplish this, the group will require a commitment from the
organization's top management.
The second approach for the formation of a development group is to staff the
group with IS security specialists augmented by individuals having whatever additional
expertise is required. The security specialists would work on the development on a
full-time basis. Also, if additional expertise cannot be obtained within the organization,
then contractual relationships could be established with outside consulting services.
[Ref. 35:pp. 107 - 111]
Each approach offers both benefits and disadvantages. Certainly, the use of
representatives from a broad range of functions would provide greater knowledge,
skills, and ideas. However, the representatives would not be available to serve in their
normal capacities while participating in the security system development. Also, there is
always the possibility that by exposing critical IS security information to a wide group
of people, there is a greater risk of intentional or accidental disclosure.
The use of IS security specialists provides the benefit of specialized knowledge
and limited exposure to critical security information. However, there may be a cost of
additional development time since the specialists will need time to become familiar with
the IS and the organization. Regardless of which approach is taken, an IS security
manager should be appointed and given the leadership of the development group.
Finally, the group should contain representatives from both the organization's and the
IS top management.
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2. Development Group Responsibilities
The development group will have overall responsibility for the planning,
design, testing, and implementation of the security system. The security stall will be
responsible for the system's management and operations.
The group's responsibilities will include the formulation of a security system
development plan and procedures for monitoring the progress of the plan. Such
monitoring will include periodic meetings, personal observation's, and the creation and
distribution of periodic reports. Estimates of security system staffing; funding;
development time; and management commitment and direction should be developed.
C. DEFINITION OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES
1. Background
First, there must be a definition of management responsibilities for IS security.
[Ref 27:pp. 1-1-6 to 1-1-8] IS security is a management responsibility. Each
organizational level must be responsible for the protection and conservation of its
assigned resources. IS security is a basic function of management control at each level
within the organization.
2. Top Management
It is the responsibility of top management for making the initial commitment
to establish an IS security system within the organization. Also, top management has
the continuing responsibility for providing a responsible and responsive managerial
climate for the system's implementation and operation. Such a commitment should
initially manifest itself in a clear and unambiguous statement of organizational security
policy and continue in the form of high managerial visibility and concern with the
effectiveness of the system.
3. Line Management
The ultimate responsibility for the protection of IS resources must rest with
those who utilize or allocate the resources. Midlevel and first-line managers and
supervisors are well positioned to identify those areas which require protective
measures and to implement (or request implementation of) such measures. At this
level, responsibilities for IS security involves the three distinct groups of users
previously identified. First, IS consumers have three responsibilities as follows:
• Ensuring that IS assets are used only for authorized purposes.
• Implementing and managing authorized IS security programs.
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• Working with the IS security staff to develop risk acceptance and management
practices when security controls adversely alTect operational effectiveness.
Second, the security responsibilities of IS owners involve:
• Determining the value of IS assets.
• Establishing levels of protection and control for IS assets based on their value
and importance.
• Establishing access and use criteria for IS assets.
• Working wiih users, custodians, and the IS security staff to monitor compliance
with the established levels of protection.
Third, IS custodians have responsibihties which include:
• Strict adherence to all owner-specified protection and control criteria for IS
assets in their custody.
• Maintaining effecjtive overall control to prevent damage or destruction that
could adversely alfect the owner's operational schedule.
4. The IS Security Staff
The IS security manager and his or her staff are the focal point for security
activities within the organization. The staff also provides an advisory function to both
top and line management. The IS security manager and staff must assume
responsibility for several activities. In conjunction with top management, they must
develop an organizational IS security policy and a structure for the assignment of
security responsibilities for the overall organization and for each functional area. Also,
they must establish operational standards and procedures for the implementation of the
IS security programs by managers at all levels. Finally, they must develop and
implement management systerhs and procedures for reviewing and evaluating
organizational IS security programs, disclosing deficiencies, and recommending
corrective actions.
D. IS SECURITY POLICY
1. Background
Once the decision to establish an IS security system has been made, a
management commitment secured, and the IS security manager appointed, it is
essential to establish an organizational IS security policy. The objectives and priorities
of the system must be clearly defined at the beginning to achieve the desired level of
system performance. There must be a clear understanding as to what is to be protected
and why it is to be protected. [Ref 27:pp. 1-2-1 to 1-2-3]
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2. Security Objectives
The organizational IS security system objectives must be defmed to establish a
direction for the system. Such objectives were discussed in Chapter III, Section C.
However, an organization may decide to modify such objectives to suit its own
requirements. Once defined, the objectives should be set forth clearly and explicitly in a
security policy statement. Such a statement should defme the powers, rights, and
accountabilities within the organization at the various levels to accomplish the
objectives. Finally, the objectives statement should be widely distributed within the
organization.
3. Security Priorities
The organization's security priorities should be delineated. Such priorities
translate the general security objectives into more specific requirements that are based
on the environment and the nature of the security tasks to be performed. There is a
number of factors specific to the organization that will have a major bearing on the
establishment of security priorities. Such factors include:
• Or^ani7.ational Functions. A significant factor involved in setting protection
priorities is the function or mission of the org.anization. In highly transaction
sensitive organizations, such as financial institutions, the highest priority is
established "for protecting and monitoring critical transactions. Other
organizations, sucn as manufacturing, may be highly process sensitive and the
priority will be established so as to ensure the confidentiality of trade data
processed. Service oriented organizations, such as consulting firms, will
emphasize the protection of client data that would place them at a disadvantage
should it become known to their competitors. Therefore, the security manager
and staff must carefully assess the function of the organization when developing
security priorities. [Ref. 27]
Availability of Security Resources. The availability of IS security resources is
another major determinant. Organizations with substantial resources
committed to IS security will necessarily structure their approach diflerently
than will an organization with more constrained resources. [Kef 27]
Level of Dependency. The organization's level of dependency can be a
significant factor for establishing priorities. Priorities could concentrate more
heavily on existing or anticipated resources and applications based on the
organization's levefat the time of security policy formulation.
E. SECURITY SYSTEM ENVIRONMENT ANALYSIS
1
. Purpose of the Analysis
The purpose of this analysis of the security system's environment is to develop
baseline security information and requirements. This will be accomplished by
performing research surveys of the organization's environment, top management, and
the IS. The information resulting from these surveys should be entered into a security




development, maintenance, and operation of the security system by centralizing and
securing the information needed to accomplish all three of these functions.
2. The Organization's Environment
The organization's environment should be surveyed to determine what security
must be incorporated within the organization. The security measures result from
environmental legal and regulatory strictures. The organization's legal staff,
consultants, legal research, or professional publications could provide a means of
obtaining relevant federal, state, local, and international laws that affect security
system development. However, several significant laws will be briefly outUned as
follows: [Ref27:pp. II- 1-2 to II-1-5]
• Privacy Act of 1974 (5 USC 552a). It established policy for collecting,
maintaining, uisclosing, and safeguarding personal information in federal
systems of records.
• Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552). It established policy for public
disclosure of information, documents, and records maintained by the federal
government.
• Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA). This act changed the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934. It provided that all firms covered under the act (i.e.,
publicly held) must devise and maintain an adequate system of internal
accounting controls.
• Public Money, Property, or Records (18 USC 64). This law established criminal
penalties for embezzling, stealing, or knowingly converting to personal use or
use of another any federal- records or property.
• Disclosure of Confidential Information (18 USC 1905). This law established
criminal penalties for disclosing trade information.
3. Organization's Top Management
The organization's top management should be surveyed to determine their IS
security needs. This survey should extend beyond the members of the top management
who are participating in the development of the security system. Surveys could be
conducted using predetermined survey documents; group meetings; or individual
discussions. Top management should be questioned concerning their opinions of the
current state of security within the organization; any problems that they wish to
discuss; their perspections of their security needs; and any suggestions that they may
have as to the manner in which the security system should be developed, operated, and
managed. Their security needs should be as narrowly defined as possible in terms of
information and applications. This is especially important since top management
generally uses specific kinds of information and applications to perform its
responsibilities. For example, top management could be using a strategic planning
application to support its planning responsibilities.
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4. The Organization's IS
The conceptual framework of an IS, presented in Chapter III, Section B,
should be used to perform an analysis of the IS. First, the IS should be surveyed by
the members of the development group to determine its objectives and measures of
performance. This information is important since such objectives and measures of
performance could conflict with the established security policy. For example, to meet
all users' requests for information, the IS may be providing information to users who
should not be receiving it. Also, its measures of performance may not contain criteria
for the reliability and protection of information and other assets.
Second, the IS's environment should be surveyed. IS users should be identified
and defined. The identification of users involves determining their names; locations;
work positions and responsibilities; their powers, rights, and accountabilities as users
and the justifications for each; the extent of computer knowledge, skills, and
experiences; and their history as users of the IS. Also, users are defined as consumers,
owners, and/or custodians. A user can be defined as one of these, two of these, or all
three of these types depending upon their rights, powers, and accountabilities. For
example, a user could have the right to receive information; to own specified IS
resources; and to act as a custodian for other IS resources. The identification and
definition of users can be obtained by researching IS records.
The organization's line and staff tasks (e.g., accounting, marketing) and
structures (e.g., departments, divisions) should be accounted for and users identified
with each one. A survey of all or a sample of users should be performed to determine
their security needs; problems; and suggestions. Such surveys could be conducted using
predetermined survey questionnaires; group meetings; or individual discussions.
Third, IS resources (assets) should be identified. Appendix A provides a listing
of defined IS assets. Each asset on the list is identified with a unique number.
Appropriate information should be entered into the security database about each asset.
Such information should include the names; locations; costs; performance history;
operating status (e.g., under repair, fully operating); quantities; purpose of asset;
producers; associated consumers, owners, and custodians; and identification data such
as serial numbers, model number, and class number. IS and/or accounting department
records should be examined to obtain this data.
Fourth, the component (tasks) of the IS should be surveyed to determine the
extent of IS capabilities. The IS may not, for example, have a communications or
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systems programming task. Systems programming may be performed under a contract
with an outside vendor. On the other hand, the IS may not have a communications
capabihty if it has a centralized configuration. The IS resources (assets) that are used
to perform each relevant component (task) should be entered into the security
database.
Fifth, the management of the IS should be examined. IS records could be
researched and discussions held with IS management personnel to obtain som.e
significant information. The configuration should be obtained to determine the extent
of the structure and deployment of IS resources and components (tasks). IS plans
should be reviewed to gain an understanding as to the planned direction of the IS.
Existing applications and those under development or those expected to undergo
development should be included in such information. This would provide some insight
into determining the organization's level of dependency. Also, the information entered
into the database should specify the technology and class of each application. All IS
policy statements, standards, rules, procedures, and guidelines relevant to security
should be obtained and read to determine the current level of management controls
over its operations. Finally, a history of security violations, problems, and audit results
should be accumulated and analyzed to determine trends and significant problem areas.
5. Baseline Security Requirements and Information
The surveys of the environment resulted in two significant accomplishments.
First, information relevant to the development, operation, and management of the
security system was obtained and entered into the security database. This information
involved environmental laws and regulations which require the organization to secure
specified assets; top management and user security needs; the IS objectives and
measures of performance; user identification and definition; IS resources (assets); IS
components (tasks); the IS configuration; IS plans and established security procedures;
and the technology and class of each existing and planned IS application.
Second, the analysis resulted in the estabhshment of a baseline or minimum
level of security requirements. These requirements resulted from the survey of
environmental laws and regulations and the organization's internal security policy and
existing procedures relevant to IS security.
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F. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PROGRAM
1. Background
It is not appropriate to approach the protection of automated systems and
their associated data assets as a monolithic issue. [Ref. 27:p. I-E- 1] In other words, all
IS applications, data, and transactions need to be afibrded the same degree of
protection. Such an approach to IS security would create several problems. First, all
applications, data, and transactions do not possess the same level of sensitivity or
criticalness. For example, an electronic funds transfer system that moves billions of
dollars daily is, of course, far more sensitive than a capital asset accounting system.
The same could be said of data. Data regarding an organization's strategic marketing
plan requires a higher level of protection than does routine purchasing and accounting
data. In order to determine efTectively the level of protection required by its
applications, data, and transactions, organizations must first identify the level of
sensitivity and criticalness of those assets. Such an approach helps to avoid a situation
of overprotecting some assets while underprotecting other ones.
A second problem that arises from a "shotgun" approach to security is that
protection resources are frequently wasted, incurring unnecessary processing overhead
and negatively affecting operational efficiency and productivity. For example, an
unnecessary security software package excessively consume processing time that could
be used for the processing of applications. Finally, an organization's inability to
objectively identify and classify IS applications, data, and transactions according to
their sensitivity and criticalness makes it difficult (if not impossible) to develop effective
IS security standards. Without these standards, it is impossible to implement either an
IS security system or an effective program of IS auditing.
Such problems can be solved by the development and implementation of an
organization-wide IS Security Classification Program. Three benefits result from such
a program. [Ref 27:p. I-E-12] First, the classification of application systems and data
on the basis of their sensitivity/criticalness permits controls to be allocated based on
specific protection requirements. This results in a higher level of overall protection and
reduced costs for security system operation. Second, the objective classification of
applications, data, and transactions permits system development and maintenance
personnel to readily identify sensitive and critical areas while implementing and
maintaining controls during development or improvement. Finally, classification
permits IS auditing to focus its activities on those applications whose sensitivity makes
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them targets of fraud or whose criticalness makes their continuity of operations a
matter of organizational survival.
2. Establishing the Classification Program
Implementation of the program should begin with the development of an
organizational framework in which all IS applications, data, and online transactions
can be analyzed, evaluated, and classified. [Ref 27:pp. I-E-1 to I-E-2] One means to
accompHsh such a process would be the establishment of a Security Classification
Review Committee. Such a committee would set policy and direct the efforts of several
classification working groups. If this approach is used, the committee should be
established at the direction of top management and should comprise the IS security
manager, the IS auditor, and the manager of applications development.
Upon its formation, the conmiittee should determine the order in which IS
applications, data, and transactions will be reviewed. Due to the impracticalities of
reviewing all such items initially, the committee should develop a list from the database
of those items that it considers the most sensitive and/or critical. Generally,
appUcations, data, and transactions should be reviewed in the following order:
All online applications currently under development. Basically, it is less
expensive ana time consuming to apply controls to applications" during their
development than when they are mstalled and operational. Also, major
disruption of IS service could result.
Existing online application systems involved in money movement or
management (e.g., electronic funds transfer systems, cash management systems).
Existing online applications involved in the movement of nonmonetary
negotiaoles (e.g., securities trading and movement systems).
Existing online applications handling sensitive proprietary or personal data
(e.g., strategic planning systems, client information systems, personnel systems).
Online appUcations handling functions critical to organizational operations
(e.g., ticketing/reservation systems, process control system).
All new and existing batch systems.
Once the applications are identified and ranked in the order in which they will be
reviewed, the committee must then manage the review process.
3. Classification Evaluation Criteria
The next step in the development of a classification program is to formulate
criteria or variables for assessing the sensitivity and criticalness of the applications,
data, and transactions. Such criteria will define sensitivity and criticalness levels in
terms of the level of damage to the organization if specified IS assets are subject to
destruction, modification, disclosure, or denial of service.
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Since each organization has unique priorities relative to the sensitivity and/or
criticalness levels of its applications and data, the Classification Review Committee
should carefully evaluate the environmental analysis results previously discussed to
determine the levels of protection required. Such an evaluation should be based on
two basic properties of application systems, data, and transactions - sensitivity and
criticalness.
a. Sensitivity
Sensitivity is the degree to which the organization will suffer damage of
some tangible and/or intangible form if application systems or the data and
transactions they store and process are subjected to one of the following: [Ref 27:pp.
I-E-2 to I-E-3]
• Compromise. Compromise may involve unauthorized disclosure of data (either
accidentally or maliciously) or the theft of resources.
• Modification. Modification includes all types of modification, either accidental
or malicious, that could result in fraud, damage to reputation, injury' to
competitive posture, embarrassment, or other negative impact on operations.
An analysis of applications, data, and transactions relative to their impact
on overall operations if compromise or modification should take place needs to be
performed by the review committee. A multilevel sensitivity classification matrix should
result from this analysis. There are five parameters or variables which need to be
considered when assessing sensitivity. [Ref 36:pp. 2-4]
• Competitive Value. The actual or potential value that the data could have to
other organizations. Such value can be quantified, such as in terms of potential
dollar loss of business or service to customer or client, effect on market share,
impact on net income, potential or unfavorable publicity, and so forth. The
basic assumption is that the greater the value of data to a competitor, the
higher the level of sensitivity. "Therefore, the more stringent the controls that
should govern its accessibility, usage, and disposition. Examples of data with
such competitive value include data on the organization's current product
(customer-satisfaction surveys, customer's master list, customer's list with
products installed, marketing surveys, planned enhancements, list of
distributors, design specifications, and cost figures), new product (design
specifications, marketing survevs, competitive analysis reports, and potential
customer list), and strategic planning (diversification plans, financial plans,
planned acquisitions, and new product direction) [Ref 33:pp. 6-7].
• Fraud Potential. This involves the extent to which the data could be used for
personal monetary gain by those within or outside the organization. An
example would involve any report indicating savings account activity that could
be used to move money between accounts and reauce the risk of detection by
operating within a time' frame which is consistent with normal account activity.
Ttie basic measurement is the potential dollar loss to the organization if a fraud
is perpetrated using the data being evaluated.
• Lepal Liability. This involves the likelihood that the organization will be
subject to legal action if the data is improperly disclosed. Also, legal liability
could result during the normal course of business if data proves to oe false or
inaccurate. (e.g., the 10-K or the annual report). This analvsis variable could be
expressed in terms of the cost of fincs/litigation. Data of this nature involves
such areas as personnel, health, credit, "financial, account balance, salary,
performance, and name and address data about individuals or organizations.
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• "Newsworthyness" . This is data which is or could be considered newsworthy by
the media or special-interest groups. The underlying premise of this variable is
that if the data is considered newsworthy bv any oT these organizations and is
not made public through normal public relations channels, Ihe data may be
distorted or misinterpret'ed.
• Financial Exposure. Financial exposure involves the dollar value of the assets or
liabilities of the organization. The commercial loan portfolio, for example, of a
bank is a significant asset. On the other hand, commercial deposits are a
significant liability. Since both of these financial items are volatile and represent
aliigh value, they would place higher on the criticalness scale than data about
fixed"^ assets.
Although organizations have varying needs in terms of sensitivity levels, the
classification process has many common factors. Appendix B presents a sensitivity
matrix that can be expanded or abbreviated to meet specific requirements. It is offered
as one means of structuring the sensitivity classification. However, an organization
may develop whatever approach it regards as appropriate to perform the classification.
The sensitivity levels (A-F), the numeric ratings (0-5), and the impact values (e.g., more
than SIO million) could vary depending on the particular circumstances of the
organization. For example, an organization's size may be so small that the impact scale
should only have a maximum of 5100,000 rather than more than SIO million. Each of
the six sensitivity levels is assigned an equivalent numeric rating. For example,
extremely critical and extremely sensitive are each assigned a numeric rating of 5 since
they represent the highest levels of sensitivity and criticalness.
b. Criticalness
Serious loss can result to an organization if it sustains serious damage from
denial or impairment of applications or data. Criticalness is a means of assessing the
type of backup, recovery, and contingency procedures employed to ensure continuity of
operations o[ critical components (tasks). There are six criteria or variables which need
to be considered when assessing criticalness. [Ref 37:pp. 2-4]
• Cost of Creation. This involves the cost in terms of time, manpower, facilities,
services, and out-of-pocket expenses to create the resources and components.
For example, research data (e.g., product or market research) is generally
collected and recorded ("created' j over an extended period of time. The
significant or real value of the data may come from the conclusions drawn from
it. Computer software represents a major example of the value of an IS resource
which could exceed its recorded or development value.
• Cost or Difficultv of Reconstruction. This involves the effort. which have to be
expended 'and the cost which would have to be incurred if the resource pr
component had to be reconstructed following its destruction or loss o'i its
integrity. Such is often the case with archival records. Both cost of creation and
cost or difficulty of reconstruction should consider existing backup provisions.
When these exist, cost evaluations must consider reprocessing, pren^um costs
that could be incurred for additional resources to facilitate reprocessing, and
costs of diverting existing resources from normal organizational activities.
• Impact on Management Decisions. This variable involves the extent to which
management decisions could be affected if data becomes unavailable or its
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integrity is violated. An example would be a problem with a bank's loan watch
report. This report is used to identify potentially troublesome loans. If this
report becomes unavailable, the number of bad loans might increase because
lending oflicers would not have the information thcv need. Therefore, in this
case, data can be viewed as impacting important decisions involving customer
relations or activity.
• Availability Constraints. This variable involves the extent of the delay which
can be tolerated between the time data is requested and the time when it is
made available. For example, a 24-hour or more delay in providing a checking
account customer with a hst of all debits and credits against his orlier account
for the past 30-days should be reasonable. However, information about the
bank's reserve posftion must be made available within a few hours after the
close of the day s business.
• Retention Constraints. Such constraints involve the degree to which retention of
the data is required by regulatory agencies and/or organizational management.
An example would be cert'ain segments of personnel data that must be retained
for a period of time specified by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and other government agencies.
• Processing Constraints. This involves the degree to which the processing of the
data is 'governed by organizational needs, management requirements, or
regulatory demands; and the degree to which other resources and components
depend on the availability and integrity of the data. Checks, for example, should
be processed for clearing within 24 hours; customer funds must be transferred
within the agreed-on time frame; the bank's reserve position must be determined
at the close of each business day. In each case, the data needed to perform the
required functions has processing constraints.
Using such criteria, criticalness classification levels could be developed for
analyzing applications, data, and transactions. Appendix- C presents a criticalness
matrix that can be expanded or abbreviated to meet specific requirements. As with
Appendix B, each of the levels is assigned a numeric rating to represent its relative
significance within the level (e.g., 5 is a higher level than 4). Also, this matrix is offered
as one means of structuring the criticalness classification. It is rare for sensitivity and
criticalness levels to coincide. A specific transaction may be extremely critical to overall
operations but may present no potential for fraud or other misuse. Therefore, a
classification scheme should be developed for each of these properties, with the
continuity of operations of applications being given the same consideration as
protection against modification or compromise.
At this time, it is important to stress caution when using Appendices B, C,
and G. These three were constructed using an ordinal measurement scale. As indicated
in the appendices, this scale only represents position in an ordered series. It does not
represent the magnitude of the difference which exists between the successive positions
in the scale. In other words, sensitivity level A with a numeric rating of 5 indicates that
it is of greater significance than E with a numeric rating of 1. However, it is not
necessarily five times as great. In fact, SIO million with a numeric rating of 5 is a
thousand times greater than S 10,000 with a numeric rating of 1.
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On the other hand, a numerical assignment of a ratio scale reflects identity,
order, and differences in magnitude. An example of such a scale would involve
measuring height by a yardstick. A person with a height of six feet is twice as tall as
someone who has a height of three feet. In the case of the three appendices, this would
mean, for example, that sensitivity and criticalness level A would be five times as great
as level E. [Ref 38:pp. 62-64]
The use of the ordinal scale will prove useful for several reasons. First, it is
difficult to establish precise dollar limits for the various levels of sensitivity and
criticalness. Extremely sensitive, for example, is greater than highly sensitive but no
defined criteria exists to establish precisely by how much of a difference does exist.
The determination of the difference becomes a matter of professional judgement and
historical experience. Second, the dollar range of the scale will vary depending upon the
size of the organization. A large organization may have a dollar scale as large or larger
than the one presented in the appendices. For example, a small organization may have
the range S 100,000 to SI,000,000 as the top level of the scale. On the other hand, a
larger organization, may have a top level of more than SlOO million. Third, it must be
emphasized that a numeric rating of 5 does not necessarily mean that an application
program, for example, would require five times as many controls and attention as an
application with a rating of 1. The rating is a guideline that should be used in
conjunction with other factors during practical design to apply a sufficient level of
protection to assets. The various classification levels also provide a means of classifying
known controls by those levels where they can be most effectively applied,
c- Classification Program Implementation
Upon the establishment of the levels of sensitivity and criticalness, the
Classification Review Committee must set policies and guidelines concerning
implementation of the program. The committee must consider two key areas in doing
this. First, there is the issue of classification authority. Authority for assigning
sensitivity and criticalness ratings should reside with the user of the application or data.
It is the user who will ultimately feel the impact of the compromise or modification of
data or the denial of service. Therefore, ownership of all applications and appropriate
data must be clearly assigned to user organizations, which then assume complete
responsibility for determining the classification levels of their respective applications,
data, and transactions. However, the results of user classifications should be reviewed
by the committee. This is necessary to prevent under- or over-classification of assets.
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Operational managers using IS resources siiould be formally delegated (in
writing) by top management through the Classification Review Committee, the tasks of
reviewing applications, data, and transactions in their task, areas and of assigning
classification levels to these resources. Responsibility for this review should be placed
at a high enough level within the user community (e.g., vice president, manager) to
ensure that it receives adequate management attention.
Second, once classification authority has been assigned, the appropriate
managers must be required to submit a schedule of classification review and evaluation
action to the review committee. The committee then needs to actively monitor review
and classification activities within the various task areas. Timely action can be ensured
if the internal audit function also monitors progress as part of its regular controls
review.
In addition to its oversight responsibilities, the committee should establish
procedures to ensure that all new resources are reviewed and classified during
acquisition or early in their development life cycle. Also, provisions should be made to
reevaluate resources periodically (e.g., every two years) to ensure that assigned
sensitivity and criticalness are still adequate and appropriate.
4. Classification Review Process
Individual classification working groups should perform the actual review and
analysis of the sensitivity and criticalness of application systems, data, and
transactions. [Ref. 27:pp. I-E-5 to I-E-12] Such groups, appointed by those managers
having classification power and responsibility for applications and data, should
comprise representatives from IS security, IS auditing, applications systems project
management, and user management. The level of sensitivity and criticalness should be
recomjnended by the working group to the responsible manager, who makes the final
decision concerning classification.
a. Data/ File Classification Review
The first step in this process is to perform the Data/ File Classification
Review. The working group should identify each file used by the applications and
analyze it using Appendices B and C. This analysis of sensitivity and criticalness is
based on several factors. First, the organization's history may prove a valuable source
of information for estimating the various classification levels. For example, the
disclosure of competitive data could have resulted in loss of business or the gain of
business for another firm. Second, various laws may specify the classification levels of
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various data such as personal or health data. Third, the professional judgment of the
working groups could play a significant role in deciding on the classification levels.
The results of the review should be entered into the security database. The information
to be entered mcludes the name and/or alphanumeric file designator; applications using
the file should be identified and a functional description of the file's data. Each member
of the working group should then independently assess the sensitivity and criticalness
of each file using the criteria of Appendices B and C. The members of the working
group should jointly examine their findings and agree on the rating to be given the file
in each of the four sensitivity/criticalness areas. Using the numeric ratings assigned in
these categories, the group should then assign an overall sensitivity/criticalness level for
the file based on the matrix presented in Appendix D. As the appendix indicates,
extremely sensitive (A) and extremely critical (G) are assigned the same numeric rating
of 5. It is rare for the two to coincide. For example, a specific transaction may be
extremely critical to overall operations (5) but may present no potential for fraud or
other misuse (0). The ratings are assigned to provide some means of assessing the
relative significance for the varying levels of sensitivity and criticalness. The sensitivity
level is determined by the highest of the three sensitivity ratings. For example, if the
competitive data level is A (5), the data with fraud potential is E (1), and the privacy
data is at F (0), then the overall sensitivity is rated at the highest of the three which is
A (5). The overall sensitivity/criticalness level should then be entered in the database
for that specific file.
b. Transaction Classification Review
If the application system being evaluated is an online application, the next
step is to perform a Transaction Classification Review. While the data/file classification
review defines sensitivity and criticalness at the database or file/data set level,
sensitivity and criticalness for online applications must also be defined at the
transaction level. Therefore, the group must identify each online transaction and its
sensitivity and/or criticalness level. There are two approaches for transaction
classification.
The first approach involves having the application development manager
identify all files accessed by the transaction. This information should then be entered
into the security database. The sensitivity and criticalness levels of the online
transaction should be determined in the same manner as the data/file review previously
discussed.
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The second approach is to classify transactions by generic type and assign a
ranking to each based on their scope and function. The following are the basic types
of transactions, ranked in order from the most critical to the one requiring the least
protection. [Ref 39;p. 69]
• Type I. These transactions affect the total IS operation. There exists the
potential that damage or a complete shut down could affect the entire IS
operation.
• Type 2. These are transactions that directly relate to the IS security svstem
itself There is the potential that a transaction would render security 'software
inoperative.
• Type 3. These transactions are not bound to any specific applications.
Examples uivolve debuggers and software tools that enhance programming
productivity. There exists the potential that a debugger, for example, could be
used to access security files and gain access to passwords and user identification
codes.
• Tvpe 4. These are the so-called "back-door" transactions which are designed
into the third-party software. A back door is a simple transaction that a
programmer designs into his or her program so that he or she can get into the
application file quickly for debugging and maintenance. Since onlv the
programmer is aware " of this transaction, and it isn't published in the
documentation, users have no way of learning it.
• Type 5. These transactions within an application program that are used to
update application files.
• Type 6. These are inquiry transactions which are not bound to a specific
appUcation.
• Type 7. These are inquiry transactions which are specific to a given application.
• Type 8. These are transactions with no security associated with them.
c. Applications Review
The third step in the review process is the analysis of the overall level of
sensitivity and criticalness of the application. In this phase, the working group
identifies the application and provides a brief functional description of overall
application operation. All files and transactions identified and analyzed during the
previous two processes and their associated sensitivity and criticalness data are then
entered into the security database. This presents the working group with a profile of
the application, including its data and transactions, as well as an objective basis for
determining application classification in terms of sensitivity and criticalness.
In developing overall application ratings, the working group should analyze
the sensitivity and criticalness levels of all files and transactions within the application.
The ratings assigned to the application should reflect the highest level assigned to any
of the constituent parts (e.g., a rating of Extremely Sensitive for any file or transaction
would render the entire application Extremely Sensitive). This ensures that the level of
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security and management review afTorded the application will be sufTicient to protect
the integrity of all its data and transactional parts.
G. CONCLUSIONS
The planning process resulted in the accomplishment of several significant results.
First, a development group was established to perform the planning, design, and
implementation of the security system. Security system development plans were
formulated with estimates for staff, funding, and time requirements. Second, the
security responsibilities of top, line, and security managements were established. Third,
an IS security policy was formulated. This policy established both security objectives
and priorities. Fourth, the laws and regulations which impose mandatory security
requirements on the organization were identified along with any relevant organizational
IS security policies and procedures. Fifth, top management and user security needs and
concerns were identified. Sixth, IS assets and users were defined and identified. Finally,
a Security Classification Program was established. IS applications, data, and
transactions were identified and assesed as to their sensitivity and criticalness. The
accumulated information was entered into the security database. The information will
be used as input to the design process which v^dll be subsequently discussed.
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V. THE DESIGN PHASE
It's on the path you do not fear that the wild beast catches you. [An African
Proverb]
A. INTRODUCTION
The design phase involves a process which results in the establishment of the
security resources (controls) part of the IS security system. Such controls are applied to
the resources (assets) of the IS to provide the required level of protection for the assets.
This application of security controls to IS assets results in the linkage or connection
between the IS security system and the IS. This linkage is produced by a process
consisting of five activities. First, threats to assets will be identified. Second, an
assessment will be conducted of the impact of such threats upon the assets. This will
involve assigning values to each asset including the logical assets (software and data).
Third, a determination as to the current security posture of the IS needs to be
performed. This will result from the information accumulated in the security database
during the planning phase as well as a security survey. The current security posture will
be compared with the results of the threat assessment to determine whether the current
level of protection is adequate to counter identified threats. If the current level is not
adequate, then a state of vulnerability exists. Fourth, a logical design should be
performed. This design represents a "virtual" design since all identified assets and
threats are matched with all possible controls needed to counter such threats. Also, it
represents the maximum possible protection that an organization could develop. Fifth,
a practical design should be developed based on the utilization of specified criteria and
constraints to the logical design. This practical design will result in a control
configuration consisting of assets, threats, and selected controls.
B. A RISK ASSESSMENT
1. Background
The activity of a risk assessment involves a detailed examination of the assets
and procedures of the IS; the vulnerabilities of the existing controls; and the threats
that may exploit such controls and result in the disclosure, modification,
destruction/damage, and denial of service of assets; and a determination of the current
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security posture of the organization. [Ref. 40:p. E-1] The purpose of the assessment is
to help top management, IS management, and security management strike an
economic balance between the impact of risks and the cost of protective controls. A
secondary benefit is the increased security awareness which will be apparent at all
organizational levels. [Ref 41:p. 3E-2] There are three tasks needed to accomplish the
risk assessment. First, threats which are existing and potential to assets will need to be
identified. Second, the economic impact of such threats will need to be estimated.
Third, a survey of existing security controls which are applied to counter those threats
will need to be conducted. A subsequent assessment will be made to determine the
extent of the vulnerability of the assets to those threats.
2. Threat Ideiitification
The first task of the risk assessment activity is to perform a threat
identification. During the planning process, IS applications and their associated data
and transactions were classified. The purpose of the classification was to determine the
relative criticalness and sensitivity of the applications, data, and transactions. In effect,
all applications, data, and transactions were prioritized based on defined criteria. The
prioritization will play a significant role during the actual allocation of security controls
within the IS as will be demonstrated during practical design.
Threat identification will involve an identification of threats to the assets
which are used to form such applications, data, and transactions. As discussed in
Chapter III, applications are what IS management develop to accompUsh its
objectives. Facilities, hardware, software, data, people, and procedures are combined
and allocated to form the applications.
A threat to an IS asset is any circumstance or set of circumstances that
possesses the potential to cause harm. [Ref 27:p. II-2-1] There are several means to
perform an identification of threats. First, the security database should be accessed to
provide a source of threats. The database contains the history of security violations
and problems which were recorded during the planning phase. This information should
involve the causes and frequency of violations and problems. Also, the nature and
locations of assets and components (tasks) can provide insight into threats. For
example, IS assets may be located in geographic areas which are suspectible to flooding
and snowstorms. Also, the IS may contain a communications component (task).
Therefore, there is the threat of the failure oi" communications software. Second,
professional publications from such organizations as the Computer Security Institute
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could provide information regarding possible threats for specific assets. Third,
professional consultants specialize in performing risk assessments and could provide
information on various threats.
Appendix E contains a listing of threats and some examples. [Ref 27:pp.
1 1-2-1 to 1 1-2- 17] The threats are categorized as to their primary' cause or source.
Natural occurrences, such as floods and fires, pose a threat to all assets. Human
intervention cannot eliminate these threats. Prior planning or controls implemented
cannot prevent their occurrence completely. However, by acknowledging the presence
of a threat, the organization can take steps to minimize its damage. Another source of
threats involves the technical operation of supporting utilities, hardware, and software.
Such threats may result from problems beyond the control of the organization (e.g.,
failure of the supporting electrical utility or the communications common carriers) or
from negligence on the part of organizational personnel (e.g., improper maintenance of
heating, ventilating, and air conditioning equipment, failure to follow established
procedures for operation of hardware). Next, human accidental threats represent the
most common threats to IS operations. These involve errors or omissions on the part
of the personnel of the organization. The final category of threat presented in
Appendix E represents hostile acts of malicious intent on the part of persons within or
outside the organization. An inventory of threats and estimates as to their probabilities
should be maintained and updated in the security database. Appendix F is an matrix
which matches each asset with the events that pose a threat to it. This matching of
asset to threat is one that has developed from historical experience as well as from
professional testing and research.
3. Impact Analysis
The purpose of an impact analysis is to assess the damage which could result
from an unfavorable event (threat) and an estimate of how often such an event may
happen. The damage can be expressed as the destruction, modification, denial of
service, and disclosure of assets. These forms of damage can be measured in both
monetary and nonmonetary terms. However, the nonmonetary impact should be
converted to an approximate monetary impact. This will permit sufficient comparisons
between alternative security controls. There are four steps needed to perform the
impact analysis. An explanation will be made of each of the four steps.
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a. Step One
The first step in the analysis is to determine how broadly or narrowly to
define the assets contained within the security database (Appendix A). For each
defined asset, all units of this asset should be in the same physical area, protected in
the same manner, and subject to damage by the same threats. If one unit of the asset is
damaged, either all other units must be highly likely to be damaged in a similar way, or
the entire asset should be rendered unusable. For example, six identical computers are
to be considered as six separate assets because damage to one of them would not imply
damage to all of them. On the other hand, do not regard a single computer as a
collection of subparts, since if one of these components were to fail, the entire
computer would be damaged to a similar level. Also, it may not be practical to break
data assets down to individual files (tapes, disc packs, etc.) for the purpose of assigning
an impact value. [Ref 40:p. E-4]
b. Step Two
The second step of the analysis is to determine which impacts would affect
the designated assets. The following definitions of impact areas should be used: [Ref
40:pp. E-4 to E-6]
• Modification. The value of logical (software and data) assets should be based
on the cost to correct the consequences of the modification and/or the cost of
locating and recovering from the modification itself The value of physical and
human assets (facilities, hardware, and people) should be based on the total
cost to detect, locate, and correct the modification.
• Destruction. Destruction results in the loss of the asset. The value of the asset
should include the cost to reconstruct or replace the asset, as well as the costs
incurred from denial of service caused by the destruction. The impact values of
software or data assets should be based on the cost to replace the asset. This
value should include the cost of reconstructing the asset from scratch or the
cost of importing and updating a copy of the asset. Labor costs required for
this reconstruction should be included. As many factors as possible should be
considered in determining the value. For example, if reliable backup tapes are
re^idily available, the impact of destruction of a data or software asset mav be
negligible. Hardware and procedural asset impact values should be based on
replacement or reconstruction of the asset. Grenerally, this would include the
purchase or construction price of the replacement. However, in some cases,
relocation costs might be considered.
• Disclosure. All financial, proprietary, and personal data should be assigned an
impact value for the impact of disclosure.
• Denial of Service. This estimated value should include the costs incurred from
all denial of service, except for that caused by the destruction of the asset. For
example, a power outage to hardware mav result in denial of service to users
without actually destroving the hardware. The impact values should be based,
when possible, on additional costs incurred and penalties assessed due to delays
in job completion. Also, an impact value should be assigned for denial of
service if operations should be delayed or cancelled or if appreciable delays
result. The quantification of such intangibles should be based on a typical case
and consider the extent of the denial and the importance of the operation or
decision. A denial of service value should be assigned to key personnel if their
absence would result in delays similar to those outlined above.
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c. Step Three
This step involves estimates as to the monetary and nonmonetary impacts
for each of the four impact areas just discussed. If the impact area affects the asset
contained in the database inventory, then the economic loss which would result from
the impact should be estimated. This loss can be measured in both monetary' and
nonmonetary terms. However, the nonmonetary impact should be converted to an
approximate monetary impact to permit sufficient comparison between alternative
security controls.
The National Bureau of Standards (NBS) [Ref 41:pp. 3E-6 to 3E-8]
indicates that the time needed for the analysis will be considerably reduced, and its
usefulness will not be decreased, if both monetary and nonmonetary impact and
frequency estimates are rounded to the factor of ten indicated in Appendix G. There
will be no significant difference in the overall exposure whether the damage from a
specific threat is estimated at S110,000 or S145,000. Also, assigning value to such
things as loss of career caused by disclosure of confidential information or suffering
caused by undue delay in the delivery of an annuity check is, in fact, more readily
performed in orders of magnitude (1, 2, 3, etc.) than in actual figures.
The sources for impact estimates include the organization's historical
accounts of security violations and problems; suppliers of the various assets; and
professional consultants. Using the estimated monetary impact amount, refer to
Appendix G and select the corresponding impact value rating (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8)
and enter this data into the database for each asset when appropriate. In other words,
for a given asset, an impact rating of from one to eight should be assigned to each of
the four impact areas of modification, destruction, disclosure, and denial of service. If
the impact does not affect the asset, then no entry is made for that asset in the
database. For example, disclosure of privacy data has a definite impact. However,
disclosure of the software program that processes that data may not have an impact.
Sufficient information which supports the impact value rating assigned should also be
entered into the database. [Ref 40:pp. E-1 to E-9]
d. Step Four
The final step involves the computation of the annual loss expectancy
(ALE). If the impact of the threat, i.e., the precise damage it could produce, and the
frequency of occurrence of that threat, i.e., the exact number of times it could happen,
could be specified, the product of the two would be a statement of loss. However, since
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the exact impact and frequency can usually not be specified, it is only possible to
approximate the loss with an ALE. This represents the product of the estimated impact
dollars (I) and the estimated frequency of occurrence per year (F). For ease in use, the
orders of magnitude for estimated frequency of occurrence can be indexed as shown in
Appendix G.
The National Bureau of Standards (NBS) has developed the matrix
presented in Appendix H. It could be used to compute the ALE of each asset for each
of the four impact areas. The impact value and the frequency of that impact will be
estimated for the appropriate asset/threat combinations which are recorded in the
database. This will be accomplished by matching the estimated impact (i) and
frequency (f) values for each threat that is associated with a given asset. The
intersection of these two values in Appendix H results in the ALE. Therefore, for each
threat that is associated with a given asset, there could be ALE values for the four
possible impact areas of disclosure, destruction, modification, and denial of service. The
four step process just described assumes that threats are mutually exclusive and does
not account for their intersection. The results of the impact analysis should be recorded
in the database.
The information which results from the impact analysis and recorded in the
database could be summarized in several ways. First, for each individual
asset/threat/impact area combination, there are estimated impact, frequency, and ALE
values. Second, the total ALE for each asset within an impact area (destruction,
modification, denial of service, and disclosure) can be derived. In other words, the ALE
for all database management systems (DBMS) that are subject to destruction can be
described. Third, the total ALE by individual threats within an impact area can be
obtained. In other words, the ALE for the unauthorized modification of application
software can be obtained. One example would involve the total ALE for the threat of
unauthorized modification of application software. Fourth, the total ALE for each
impact area can be determined. For example, the total ALE for the disclosure impact
area can be obtained. Finally, the total ALE for all four of the impact areas can be
determined. This would represent the total estimated loss that the organization would
face from the four combined impact areas of modification, destruction, disclosure, and
denial of service. It is important to stress that each of these estimated values will
change as revised estimates are made of impact (i) and frequency (f) variables.
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e. Vulnerability Assessment
The final step in the risk assessment is the performance of a vulnerability
assessment. This assessment involves three items. First, an asset subject to loss.
Second, a threat(s) to that asset that could result in damage to it. Third, the state of
security, in terms o^ the lack of or weak controls, that would allow the threat to cause
damage. Asset and threat information are already recorded in the database. A survey of
the security controls which have been applied to IS assets will need to be performed.
Appendix I provides a listing of security controls which can be applied to
assets to provide protection from various threats. Each listed control is assigned an
identifying number. A survey should be performed to determine which of these
controls, if any, are currently applied to IS assets. IS records should be reviewed and
personal inspections made to determine the extent of the controls applied to assets. If
the controls applied against assets to counter threats are insufficient to adequately
protect the assets then vulnerability exists. [Ref 35:p. 166]
The degree of adequacy of existing controls can be determined in several
ways. First, the database should contain whatever information is available regarding
the history of security violations and problems of the IS. The historical performance of
the controls can be reviewed to estimate the degree of adequacy of the control in
countering specified threats. The historical records may reveal vulnerability. Second, if
history is not available or is immaterial in volume, then control reliabihty information
could be obtained from outside sources. Such sources could include professional
publications and vendor material. Third, tests could be performed to estimate the
reliability of existing controls against a variety of threats. The threat conditions
applicable to the asset could be simulated and the reliability of the controls applied to
those assets estimated. Examples would involve both physical and logical access
attempts; the inputting of erroneous data; and power failures. The results of the
vulnerability assessment should be recorded in the security database. The discovered
vulnerabilities should be ranked based on which provide the greatest, great, and least
threats to the previously classified apphcations, data, and transactions. For example,
does vulnerability 1 pose the greatest, great, least or no threat to all applications, data,
and on-line transactions which were classified as extremely sensitive and critical, and so
on? This threat to the various applications, data, and transactions should be expressed
in economic terms as was previously discussed. The results of the vulnerability
assessment should be recorded in the securitv database.
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C. LOvJICAL DESIGN
Logical design involves the expansion of the currently existing inventory of
controls contained in the database to include all possible controls which could be used
to counter identified threats. This expansion leads to the development of what may be
called a "virtual" design since all identified assets and threats are matched against all
possible controls needed to adequately counter such threats and protect the assets.
Other things being equal, logical design represents the maximum possible protection
that could be applied without regard for such factors as funding hmits and the
adequacy of the current level of protection. This design represents an inventory of
appropriately matched controls. Appendix J provides a matrix which consists of
controls which are identified with specific threats and assets. It matched each
asset/threat combination which was identified in Appendix F with corresponding
controls. This information should be entered into the security database.
Controls can be identified from several sources. First, the organization may have
existing controls and historical records of their performance and suppliers. Second,
there are organizations that provide such controls such as vendors who produce and
market security software packages and fire detection devices. These vendors provide
demonstrations of their products and offer material describing their characteristics.
Third, professional publications provide information on existing and newly developed
security controls. Fourth, vendors offer public fairs of their products at different
locations throughout the country.
As much information as possible should be recorded about the controls in the
database. Such information would include the control name; purpose;
series/model/class/type/line; vendor; cost; ease of use; reliability; development and
installation time; state of the art status; availability; insurance requirements; skill level
needed to develop, install, and operate; and possible impacts on IS performance and
availability if employed. The logical design will be used to support the practical design
which follows.
D. PRACTICAL DESIGN
The practical design involves the construction of a configuration of assets,
threats, and controls which will be applied to the threats to protect the assets within
specified constraints. The logical design matched each asset and threat combination
with a number of controls which could be used to counter the threats. However, due to
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several reasons, all the controls cannot or should not be applied to the assets to
counter the threats.
First, the practical design is subject to funding constraints which were imposed
by top management during the planning phase. Second, specific IS applications, data,
and transactions were previously classified as to their sensitivity and criticalness during
the planning phase. Each application and its associated data and transactions were
assigned levels of criticalness (extremely critical, highly critical, critical, moderately
critical, minimumally critical, and noncritical) and sensitivity (extremely sensitive,
highly sensitive, sensitive, moderately sensitive, minimumally sensitive, and
nonsensitive). Therefore, applications, data, and transactions can be prioritized based
on their criticalness and sensitivity. One application, for example, could have a higher
priority than another application. The higher prioritized application would justify more
protection over one that is less in priority. Third, the previously performed
vulnerability assessment could have revealed that the surveyed classified assets were in
various states of protection due to the strengths of the existing applied controls.
Therefore, some of the prioritized assets will require the additional application of
controls and some assets will not. Fourth, the controls which are recorded in the
database can be further divided as to their applicabilities by sensitivity/criticalness
levels. In other words, some controls are more effective against extremely critical
applications and some are not.
The personnel responsible for the practical design must select the most
cost-effective controls from among those listed in Appendix K. The appendix is a
breakdown of the total number of controls listed in Appendix I. It applies each of the
controls to specific sensitivity and criticalness levels. This matching of control to
classification is one that results from historical experience and testing of the controls to
determine their capabilities and reliabilities. For example, control number 34. 1 involves
the locking of all data and program files in a fire-resistant room or container when not
actually in use. The access to the files should be limited to authorized personnel only.
This control has proven to be applicable to all six levels of criticalness. The cost of
each control as recorded in the database should be considered in three different ways:
first, in regards to the ALE reduction that it brings about, then the total cost of the
combined controls should be considered in relation to the net ALE reduction, and
finally the additional ALE reduction by each control should be compared to its share
of the total cost. For a control to result in a monetary savings, the amount saved over
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the life cycle of the control must exceed the cost of its installation and maintenance.
Any control which meets this specification is considered cost-effective. [Ref 40:p. E-10]
THREATS ITEMS A B C D
1 (a) S20.000 S20.000 SI 8,000
I (b) 9,000 15,000 8,0(30
1 (c) 11,000 5,'JOO 1 5,000
2 (a) 10,000 12,000
2 (b)
2 (c) 10,000 12,000
3 (a) 4,000 6,000
3 (b) 1,000
3 (c) 3,000 6,000
4 (a) 2,000 4,000
4 (b) 5.000 2,000
4 (c) -3,000 2,000
Source: Ref 41:p. 3E-19.
Figure 5.1 Array of Controls vs Threats.
By constructing a matrix such as shown in Figure 5.1, the threats and the
controls which could affect one or more of them can be displayed. The threats should
be arranged in order of the ALE attributable to them (highest to lowest). Each
intersection in the matrix should contain three items of information: (a) the estimated
ALE reduction, (b) the annual cost of the measure, and (c) the resultant annual saving.
Great precision is not required in obtaining these figures. The annual cost of a measure
is presented opposite the most serious threat which it affects; opposite any other threat
which is affected only the increase in cost to cover that threat is noted.
The cost-effectiveness of the previously identified existing controls should be
evaluated as well. The existing controls should all be included in the matrix but only
the annual maintenance costs need be considered, not the initial installation costs since
those have already been expended. The cost of controls which are not used solely for
the purpose of IS security should be prorated if possible. It is also the proper time to
consider replacement costs. The replacement of equipment should be treated like any
other remedial measure. The situation could arise that the cost of replacing equipment
is less, in some cases, than its protection.
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Comparing all the controls which remedy the same threat (or lesser included
threats) will indicate which one is the most cost efTective in the given circumstances. In
Figure 5.1, control A, costing 510,000, provides a S24,000 saving against threats 1, 2,
and 3 while control B, costing SI 7,000, provides a $25,000 summed saving against
threats I, 2, 3 and 4. The two controls combined, at a cost of 527,000, provide an ALE
reduction of 549,000. However, the final comparison indicates that the 510,000
expenditure for control A only produces an additional saving o[ 56,000 over that
obtained by the 517,000 expenditure. In some cases, it may be determined that the
additional reduction is necessary; in other less sensitive situations, the cost saving will
be adopted instead. In addition, care should be exercised to insure that the controls
chosen to counter certain threats do not increase the estimated frequency of other
threats.
With all of the ALE reduction and cost estimates arrayed, various combinations
of controls can be considered tentatively until a satisfactory aggregation of security
controls is achieved. The matrix will prove useful in explaining to top management why
particular controls should be selected for testing and installation. [Ref. 41:pp. 3E-1S to
3E-19]
E. CONCLUSIONS
The design phase results in the selection of a configuration of assets, threats, and
controls. The selected controls represent the establishment of the security controls part
of the IS security system. The following chapter will involve sufficiently implementing
the selected controls. This implementation will establish the link between the two
systems.
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VI. THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE
To err is human; to really foul up requires a computer. [Bill Vaughan]
The psychic task which a person can and must do for himself is not to feel secure
but to be able to tolerate msecurity. [Erich Fromm]
A. INTRODUCTION
The operations phase will involve a process of security system installation,
testing, and management. First, the selected controls that have been approved will need
to be implemented during a period of installation. Such installation should be
performed in an orderly planned manner with accompanying user and security staff
awareness and training. Second, the controls which resulted from the design phase
process will need to be tested. This testing is required to ensure that the entire control
configuration as well as its individual control elements are functioning as required.
Such testing should be performed on a continuous basis as new controls are added to
the configuration over time. Finally, the management and components (tasks) parts of
the security system will need to be established. These two parts will permit the proper
operation and management of the security system.
B. INSTALLATION OF CONTROLS
After the selection of controls, the security staff must concentrate their efforts
toward the installation of the selected controls within the IS. Like all projects, the
security system development must compete with other organizational programs for
recognition and resources. To ensure the greatest probability of success, the security
manager should make the following preparations.
First, the security manager should develop a prioritized list of requirements that
need top management approval and/or funding. Such requirements should be based on
the practical design analysis which was performed during the design phase. They should
also reflect other organizational considerations, such as current cash position or market
pressures, that might not have been fully reviewed m the analysis. Finally, it is
important that the list should address not only the acquisition of security resources and
services but the top management decisions that must be made to initiate or facilitate
program implementation.
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Second, it should be specifically indicated what is necessary for implementing the
proposed program. The significant part of this process is the development of a realistic
estimate of financial, personnel, and other resources needed to implement a given
recommendation. These estimates were developed during the planning and design
phases. However, circumstances may require revised estimates.
Third, detailed technical specifications covering IS security controls that must be
developed or procured should be produced. Such development and procurement should
be performed in conjunction with technical personnel. Fourth, a comprehensive
acceptance test plan should be developed in conjunction with the technical and
management staffs.
C. TESTING AND EVALUATION OF CONTROLS
1. Test Planning
The development of a test plan which defines the scope of the test must be
considered first. The assumptions regarding how the system is supposed to operate; the
effectiveness of security features; the reliabihty of personnel; and the actions of the user
are to be challenged. The testing process should provide for the analysis of these areas.
There may be some areas which do not require explicit testing. However, the practices
and procedures used should be analyzed to ascertain the adequacy of protection and to
identify potential problems. The testing process should encompass a detailed
examination and attempted systematic subversion (singly and in combination) of the
security controls and features of the system. It is understood that operating procedures
will vary widely among different organizations. However, certain basic areas should be
included in any test plan. [Ref 27:pp. III-l-l to III-1-2]
• Physical Security. The major concern in this area is determining whether there
are exploitable gaps in the phvsical security of the system, including the central
computer facility and remote terminal areas. The security of the phvsical plant
;
heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems; power distribution; fire
detection and suppression systems, and so on should be tested and evaluated.
Special, attention should be"^ paid to areas where the degrees of control and
protection are not consistent and locations where resources are geographically
removed from the central facility.
• Personnel Security. Tests in this area should determine whether all personnel
with access to fS resources have been properly screened and have received
security training. Also, the testing should review the adequacv of security
training and of^programs designed to ensure the loyalty ana refiability of IS
personnel.
Hardware and Software Security. The emphasis with this area should be on
testing the security features of the hardware and software separately and m
combination, and on determining the ability of these features to prevent
malicious exploitation of IS vulnerabilities. The plan of the test should involve
hardware, systems software, and application programs to ensure that the




• Communications Security. All communications hardware, software, circuitry,
and mstailation procedures should be examined and tested to ensure that an
adequate level of protection is maintained throughout the communications
system. Specificallv^ this involves checking the security of front-end processors
and/ or communications controllers, hard-wired communications links, and the
interface between the computer and the network as well as the proper
functioning of cryptographic systems.
• Procedural Security. The purpose of testing in this area should be to identify
deficiencies in operational procedures and/or their execution that could be
exploited for unauthorized disclosure or modification of data or the denial of
service. Also, it should be determined whether appropriate handling procedures
and administrative controls are being^enforced for the level of information being
processed or stored in the svstem. Testing in this area may overlap, to some
degree, testing in other areas due to the integrated nature of most systems.
Areas, that should be covered include procedural implementation of
organizational security plans; computer center operations* terminal operation
procedures; system software and application program development procedures;
and emergency procedures.
2. The Test Team
At the conclusion of test planning, the security manager should organize the
test team. It is not likely that the security manager and the staff will possess all the
necessary personnel, technical skills, and, therefore, other personnel should be made
available to provide assistance. Guard force workers, for example, can be invaluable in
evaluating physical access control, their own operations, and overall security of
physical resources.
Personnel or human resources department workers can aid in testing and
evaluation preemployment screening, security training, and terminal practices.
Communications personnel can test cryptographic systems, communication hardware,
and communications facilities. Members of the programming/computer operations staff
members can assist in developing and conducting technical tests of hardware and
system and apphcation software. Such personnel can also assist in evaluating technical
test results and in formulating enhancements based on this testing. [Ref 27:pp. I1I-1-2
to III-1-3]
3. The Testing Process
It is important that a detailed schedule and procedures for the actual testing
should be developed. The tests should be conducted so as to cause as Uttle disruptions
of normal operations as possible. Generally, testing should not be performed when the
system is utilized for software development or testing; during implementation of new
hardware or software; or during critical processing cycles such as payroll or billing.
a. Testing Tools
There are a number of tools which could be used to perform the tests. Such
tools can be specifically applied to each control. For example, a significant security
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hardware device is an emergency power system. Tests of such a system should include a
review of its inspection records to determine if inspections are being performed as
required; and to conduct periodic tests through simulations of power outage
conditions. The security database should be further expanded to include an inventory
of appropriate tests for each control in the database. There may be multiple tests, as
indicated, for each control. Therefore, each test should be specifically designated to
distinguish it from other tests that could be applied to that control. [Ref 27:p. III-C-2]
b. Conducting the Tests
There should be comprehensive recording of the testing process in the
security database. The control tested; the testing tool(s) used to perform the tests; the
test dates; and the results of the tests should be recorded. A standard test report should
be designed to be used to report the results of all tests. [Ref 27:p. III-1-3]
4. Test Evaluations
The evaluation of test results should only be performed after all testing is
complete. Some tests may review a control for more than one protective quality or may
require several steps. For example, a security guard force provides protection against
unauthorized physical access. Also, it provides a means of visually detecting fire,
internal flooding, and the like. Therefore, testing the performance of the force involves
testing its training and procedures in all areas.
In those areas suffering minor deficiencies, the security manager should review
the deficiencies with the manager responsible for that area and attempt an on-the-spot
correction. If the deficiency is corrected, no additional action is required. On the other
hand, if deficiencies are extensive or particularly severe, or when corrective actions will
require a substantial outlay of resources, then the results of the team will require
review and evaluation by top management.
a. Recommending Security Enhancements
After the performances of tests and their recording on the database, the
team should meet to decide on recommendations for corrective measures or
enhancements for areas where test results have been unsatisfactory. The individual test
results should be reviewed by the entire team. In some instances, security
enhancements may resolve the inadequacy of multiple controls. For example, it may
have been discovered that the names of departed personnel are still being carried on
the computer-facility access records. The implementation of adequate check-out
procedures for terminating employees will correct the deficiency.
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When the team has completed its analysis and developed its
recommendations, a copy of the findings should be forwarded to each manager
concerned as well as to top management. Such reporting should be considered highly
sensitive and confidential and should be stringently controlled. The database should be
updated to reflect the current status of each deficiency discovered during testing. [Ref
27:p. Ill- 1-4] There are two basic installation strategies that could be followed. The
first is the pilot strategy. Such a strategy involves installing the controls on a selected
segment of the IS. For example, it may prove advisable to install the controls
apphcation by application. This approach could prove time consuming but it could
isolate the damages in case the new controls prove to be a problem. A second strategy
involves a phased approach. For example, data entry or data processing controls could
be installed in phases over a select period of time. This approach could prove effective
if the data entry or data processing controls are considered highly complex and difficult
to install. Therefore, it becomes more prudent to break down the installation of the
controls in more manageable phases. [Ref 33 :p. 1 11]
D. SYSTEM MANAGEMENT
1. System Organization
There are three issues which should be addressed regarding the organization of
an IS security system. First, there is the issue of the appropriate system configuration.
As indicated in Chapter III, the system can be configured in either a centralized or
decentralized manner. The appropriate security system configuration is the one that
corresponds to the manner in which IS resources and components are structured and
deployed within the organization. In other words, if IS resources and components are
centralized then IS security controls should be deployed to correspond with it.
The second issue concerns the placement o[ the security manager's position
within the organization. It is of the utmost importance that the position be as
independent as possible. The matter of independence becomes even more critical as the
organization's level of dependency and the value of its IS assets rise. It would seem
that the best means of achieving such independence is to have the security manager
accountable to the highest official in the organization (e.g., the chief executive ofiicer,
chairman of the board, director). Another approach is to have the security manager
accountable to a governing body (e.g., board of directors, trustees) or a subdivision of
such a body (e.g., audit committee, security committee). Also, such higher authorities
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would be responsible for such items as approving the appointment of an individual to
such a position, approving the IS security budget and annual security plan, approving
the salary and performance appraisal of the security manager, and the approval of all
test results.
The third issue involves the number of organizational units that are in a
reporting relationship with the security manager and his staff. It is important that
there be open established lines of communication between the security manager and
the classification review committee; IS management; top management; users; and the
internal audit staff. One means of achieving an effective working relationship between
all the parties is to establish a permanent security committee. This committee would
meet on a regular basis to discuss security issues and to estabUsh security policy.
2. Security Planning
Security planning involves several significant activities. First, both short range
and long range planning should be performed. Short range planning is essentially
operational in nature. That is, it is responsible for planning the implementation of the
annual security plan. Second, long-range planning should be established. Such
planning seeks to anticipate or project future threats and vulnerabilities to the IS. Both
types of planning should be highly coordinated with IS planning activities.
3. Security System Staffing
There are several issues in regard to the staffing of the security system. First,
security staff salaries, promotions, and performance evaluations should be determined
by the security manager as much as possible with the approval of the highest levels of
management. This is necessary to maintain the independence and objectivity of the IS
security staff Second, security staff personnel, even those who work within a
decentralized security system configuration, should report directly to the organization's
IS security manager. Once again, this is to maintain the elements of objectivity and
independence. Finally, due to the dynamics of IS technology, it is critical that the
security staff be provided with appropriate IS security training. The staff should
maintain a Ubrary of professional books and periodicals.
4. Security System Monitoring and Evaluation
The security staff is responsible for the monitoring, investigation, and
reporting of the security system's performance. This is accomplished in several major
ways. First, the staff can attempt violations at different times and at different levels
within the IS. The purpose of the violations is to determine if the system responds to
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such violations in the required time and manner. Second, various kinds oi' scenarios
and drills can be performed to train users and to test the installed controls. Examples
include disaster recovery and fire drills. Third, selected user actions could be monitored
and investigated to determine if such actions were within their authority. Examples of
such actions would involve data update, transfer, and destruction, especially o[ data
previously classified as extremely critical and extremely sensitive.
5. Security Components (Tasks)
A structure will need to be formed to perform the security tasks that were
discussed in Chapter III, Section C. These tasks involve avoidance, deterrence,
prevention, detection, and recovery and correction. Depending on the scope of security
responsibilities, separate departments (or divisions) could be formed for each task. For
example, the security staff would have a separate department that is only responsible
for various kinds of recovery and correction programs (e.g., contingency plans, off-site
back-up, on-site back-up). If the scope of the security staffs responsibilities are more
limited due, for ex?.mple, to an organization being at a lower level of IS dependency,
then sevc:-al of the tasks could be combined in one department. For example, one
department could be responsible for recovery and correction as well as preventive
programs (e.g., personnel screening, external labels, protect rings for magnetic tapes).
6. The Security Database
During the course o[ the planning, design, installation, and testing of the
security system, various items of information were entered into what was defined as a
security database. This information will serve as a basis for effectively managing and
maintaining the security system. A description of the contents of the database is
contained in Appendix L.
It is important that the information contained within the database be updated,
expanded, or reduced as circumstances within the organization and its environment
changes. The database provides a means for recording and analyzing such changes and
for planning appropriate responses. By doing so, it provides a valuable decision
support tool that should be centrally maintained and controlled by the security staff
There are some significant changes which will affect the database which
warrant a brief discussion. First, new laws may be passed which could require the
installation of new controls on assets. Also, as an organization expands it operations, it
may deploy facilities and people overseas and into different parts of the U. S. This
could subject the organization to whatever security-related laws exist within these
areas.
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Second, changes can occur to the inventory of assets. If assets are added, then
the process of classification, threat identification, impact analysis, vulnerability
assessment, logical design, practical design, and implementation should take place. On
the other hand, if assets are deleted from the inventory, the controls which are applied
to protect them should be removed when considered necessary.
Third, the classification program results may have to be changed.
Circumstances may require either increasing or decreasing the classification levels of
various applications, data, and transactions. Such changes could be caused by the
growing significance or insignificance of an application, such as a customer service
system, to the organizations operations.
Fourth, the type and probability of various threats could change over time. As
new assets are added to the organization's inventory, the events which pose threats to
such assets should be determined and studied. The probabilities of the occurrences of
these threats will change over time based on historical experiences and the results of
various tests.
Fifth, there will be changes to the results of impact analyses. Such changes
are caused by changes in the costs of replacing and correcting the impacts caused by
the threats.
Sixth, an organization's state of vulnerability changes over time. This state is
essentially an indication of the organization's level of protection over its assets at any
given point in time. As the combination of assets, threats, and controls changes over
time, so does the state of vulnerability. One measure of the performance of the security
staff is how material the vulnerability state is at any given point and the length of time
that such a state has existed. The materiality of the state could be measured by the
number of vulnerabilities which pose the greatest threats to those applications, data,
and transactions which were classified as extremely sensitive and extremely critical. The
results of the various testings, monitorings, and audits provide additional information
which would help determine the state of the IS vulnerability and provide a means to
assess its performance.
E. CONCLUSIONS
This phase resulted in the installation and testing of the controls which were
selected during the design phase. Also, a structure, components (tasks), procedures,
people, and information were combined to provide an overall management for the
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developed security system. The system's management has two significant
responsibilities. First, it is responsible for ensuring that the established security system
is performing in an elfective and efficient manner. Second, the security system
management is responsible for ensuring that the system appropriately responds to both
internal and environmental changes which affect it.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
This new development (automation) has unbounded possibilities for good and for
evil. [Norbert Wiener]
This thesis is ended the way it was started. That is, with a statement about the
potentials for both the good and bad that could result from the unleashing of
automation technology upon society. Just as the unleashing of the power that fuels the
stars has had ever growing consequences upon the way man lives, so too has the
unleashing of the physical and logical properties that can manipulate and communicate
pulses of electricity. The good of automation technology has been present from the
beginning of its infusion within the society. It has only been in recent years that the
dangers and problems have been given greater attention. It is in response to these
dangers and problems that IS security arises as an issue. It embodies two of the basic
principles of our democratic society. That is, the need for appropriate checks and
balances and that unlimited power could eventually lead to the limitation of human
rights and freedoms. The infusion of automated technology has grown ever rapid and
wider. This thesis offered a brief description of just how wide and rapid the applications
of the technology have become throughout society and some of the dangers which
have resulted.
This thesis also offered a means of viewing computers in a much broader and
more refined context than that usually offered. The approach offered involved
addressing the subject of computers from the context of a "system". The conventional
definition of a computer system narrowly defines it as consisting of hardware, software,
people, data, and procedures. However, within the broader context of a "systems
approach", these items would only just represent the resources part. The remaining
parts involve the objectives, environment, components (tasks), and the management.
Within this framework, an "information system" is defined. The same approach was
followed to construct a framework for a security system.
As a means of constructing an IS security system within this framework, a three
phased generic development model was presented. The planning phase of the model
establishes security policy (objectives and priorities); determines the extent of security
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requirements; identifies assets requiring protection; and classifyies the assets based on
their level of criticalness and sensitivity. This classification forms the basis of the
subsequent design of controls which will be applied to the assets to provide the
necessary protection. This design of controls involves an initial identification of threats
and their probable economic impacts to the assets. The current state of protection
provided to the assets is subsequently assessed. A configuration of controls is
constructed to remedy any estabUshed security weaknesses. The implementation phase
provides the testing and installation of the controls which are needed to actually link
the IS security system with the IS. A management structure is established to maintain
and improve the developed security system.
It is believed that the thesis offers a definitional framework and development
model of sufficient substance so as to serve as a basis for the performance of security
system developments within a broad range of organizations. The depth and scope
within each phase will vary by its application to a wide range of organizational
situations. However, the basic concepts of asset identification, definition, and
classification; threat identification; impact analysis; vulnerability assessment; and the
cost-benefits of controls should remain stable enough to provide a basis for the model's
change and continued use over time. An organization's need for this model or any
other security system development and management approach will be substantially
increasing over time. The causes for this increasing need lie outside and within an
organization.
There is a rising public awareness and concern with the issues of IS security. The
political institutions are responding more and more with laws which address these
issues. For example, at the time of this writing, the Congress of the U. S. approved the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986. [Ref 42:pp. 1 & 8] If signed by the President,
as expected, the act will expand federal jurisdiction to cover interstate computer crimes
in the private sector. The act would make it a federal misdemeanor to traffic in stolen
passwords with intent to defraud or to intentionally trespass in a "federal-interest
computer" to observe or obtain data. It would be a felony to access such a computer
for a theft-by-computer scheme or to alter or destroy computer data - if the victim
suffers a loss of at least SI,000 or if the files are medical records - without
authorization. Also passed by the Congress and awaiting the President's signature is
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. This act would change and update the
1968 Federal voice-oriented wiretap law to reflect dramatic changes in computer and
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communications technologies, including the expansion of electronic mail and
development of computer networking. It would make it illegal to access electronic
messages without authorization. On an international scale, there are efforts underway
to control transborder data flow (TBDF), or the transmissions of electronic
information across national borders. The protection o[ the content of the information
being transmitted is a major issue that is under discussion. [Ref 43:p. 37] It is believed
that this continued public awareness and regulation will be increasing the mandatory
IS security responsibilities of organizations. This will require increased internal
expenditures for IS security.
Also, as organizations come to rely more and more on computer technology for
basic operational needs as well as to support the achievement of strategic objectives,
there are increasing pressures to protect their IS assets. This increasing reliance on
computer technology is reflected in rising levels of dependency which was previously
discussed. Both the external and internal pressures faced by organizations to provide
adequate IS security makes it increasingly essential that they have an orderly,
well-defined approach for developing, operating, and managing a system which can




1.0 FACILITIES. These include a data center's physical
plant and its supporting devices and utilities.
1.1 Physical Plant. Actual structure in which data proces-
sing and communications are housed including auxiliary
buildings such as PBX areas, generator buildings,
cooling towers.
1.2 Electrical Power Systems. Transformers, wiring,
generators, power filters, uninterruptible power
sources, emergency/backup power units.
1.3 Environmental Support Systems. Air conditioning
compressors, dehumidifiers, air-handling units, duct-
work, water chilling units, thermostats, humidistats,
plumbing, air intake equipment.
1.4 Fire Detection and Suppression Systems. Smoke/heat
detectors annunciator panels, alarms, Halon 1301/1211,
C02 , water sprinkler systems.
1.5 Intrusion Detection and Alarm Systems. Motion detec-
tors, magnetic contact switches, vibration sensors,
annunciator panels, alarms, closed-circuit television
and videotape recording units, facility access control
monitoring systems.
2.0 Hardware. This includes all data processing and commun-
ications hardware.
2.1 Central Processing Unit. Main memory, cache memory,
arithmetic logic unit, channels, operating console,
system disk, associated peripheral processing units.
2.2 Magnetic Storage Devices. Magnetic disks (including
floppies) , tape, drum.
2.3 Local Input/Output Devices. Printers, card readers,
MICR readers, local terminals, COM units.
2.4 Communications Controllers. Auxiliary processors placed
between CPU and transmission facilities to handle such
functions as line management and code translation.
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2.5 Modems. Devices translating signals between
input/output devices and communications lines.
2.6 Terminal Concentrators. Devices that link multiple
channels to allow use of common transmission channels.
2.7 Digital Switches. Devices designed to create or break a
physical communications circuit, generally within a
network control center.
2.8 Remote Input/Output Devices. All input/output devices
on distal (outbound) side of model (e.g., remote
terminals)
.
2.9 Cryptographic Devices. Devices designed to encrypt or
scramble voice or data transmissions, rendering them
unintelligible if intercepted by unauthorized persons; a
compatible device decrypts messages into intelligible
form at receiving end.
2.10 Multiplexors. Devices that take a number of communi-
cations channels and combine signals into one common
channel for transmission; at receiving end, demultiplex-
er separates signals.
2.11 Local Loop. Communications circuit between user loca-
tion and telephone company central office.
2.12 Terrestrial Microwave Circuits. All proprietary
terrestrial microwave communications circuits and
facilities maintained and operated by user for local or
long haul communications.
2.13 Satellite Circuits. Proprietary satellite communica-
tions circuits and facilities, such as earth stations
and antennas, operated by user for point-to-point satel-
lite transmission.
3.0 Software. This group of assets includes all systems and
applications software and chips used by the mainframe
and distributed processors.
3.1 Operating Systems. Systems software (generally vendor
supplied) that performs job control/scheduling,
input/output control, interrupt, file maintenance, high-
level language support (compilers/assemblers) , memory
allocation, logging of system activities (e.g., MVS,
OS/MVT, GCOS)
.
3.2 Data Base Management Systems. All software necessary to




3.3 Communications Control Software. Software contained in
either host processor or a network frontend communica-
tions controller that controls such functions as message
switching, line monitoring/control, message parity/error
checking, handshaking, line allocation.
3.4 Security Software. Software designed to conduct extend-
ed access checking beyond that performed by communica-
tions software or operating system, to restrict access
to protected resources, and to monitor line activity.
3.5 Applications Software. All user-oriented software
developed in high-level languages and running under
supervision of operating system.
4.0 Data. Data can be defined in three broad groups.
4.1 Financial Data. Checking account balances, accounts
payable/receivable, funds transfer balances.
4.2 Proprietary Data. Sensitive business data (trade
secrets) , sensitive non-business data (personnel
records, salary levels), restricted records (tax
records, public assistance information, other records
restricted by law or regulation)
.
4.3 Personal Data. Personnel records (pay, performance),
credit records, medical records, educational records,
all records covered by state and federal privacy laws.
5.0 People. There are seven groups of people.
5.1 Computer Operator. Operates computer from console;
alters job schedules/priorities, initiates program exe-
cution, responds to system error messages,
mounts/demounts magnetic media.
5.2 Data Entry Clerk. Operates remote terminal; enters
transactions, data, programs.
5.3 Media Librarian. Files, retrieves, accounts for offline
storage of data/programs on removable magnetic media;
provides media to production control, cycles backup to
remote facilities.
5.4 System Programmer. Designs, develops, installs, docu-
ments, maintains operating systems, DBMSs, communica-
tions software, system accounting features, security
software packages.
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5.5 Application Programmer. Designs, develops, installs,
documents, maintains user programs and application
systems.
5.6 IS Security Manager. Plans, implements, installs, oper-
ates, maintains, and evaluates physical, operational,
technical, procedural, personnel-related controls.
5.7 IS Auditor. Performs operational, software, and data
file reviews to determine adequacy, performance,
security, compliance with organizational policy, proce-
dures, standards; participates in design specification
of applications to ensure adequacy of controls.





A B C D E F
Competitive Data
The willful or inadvertent release
or disclosure of this data could
result in a competitor being given
a significant business advantage
over the organization. The effect
of such disclosure on the bottom
line could be:
5 = More than $10,000,000 X
4 = $1,000,000-$10,000,000 X
3 = $100,000-$1,000,000 X
2 = $10,000-$100,000 X
1 = Up to $10,000 X
= None X
Data with Fraud Potential
Unauthorized modification of
accounting or authorization data
that controls the disbursement of
funds could result in a fradulent
disbursement of:
5 = More than $10,000,000 X
4 = $1,000,000-$10,000,000 X
3 = $100,000-$!, 000, 000 X
2 = $10,000-$100,000 X
1 = Up to $10,000 X
= None X
Privacy Data
Personal data directly traceable
to an individual either is covered
under federal, state, or local
privacy legislation or is considered
company private. This data consists
of: 5 = Personal/Health/Credit Data X
4 = Financial/Account Balance Data X
3 = Salary/Performance Data X
2 = Name/Address Data X




A = Extremely Sensitive = 5
B = Highly Sensitive = 4
C = Sensitive = 3
D = Moderately Sensitive = 2
E = Minimally Sensitive = 1
F = Nonsensitive =






G H I J K L
Criticalness
The availability and accuracy of this
data have the following effect on
overall application operation:
5 = System cannot operate without it.
4 = System would be seriously im-
paired to the point where its
usefulness would be
questionable.
3 = System operation would be
degraded; however, main
functions would be useful or
available.
2 = System would experience some
impact; however, all functions
would be usable or available
with somewhat degraded response
times.
1 = System would be minimally
impacted by loss of this data;




G = Extremely Critical = 5
H = Highly Critical = 4
I = Critical = 3
J = Moderately Critical = 2
K = Minimally Critical = 1















F F F L
1 E E E K
2 D D D J
3 C C C I
4 B B B H
5 A A A G
NOTE:
A = Extremely Sensitive = 5
B = Highly Sensitive = 4
C = Sensitive = 3
D = Moderately Sensitive = 2
E = Minimally Sensitive = 1
F = Nonsensitive =
G = Extremely Critical = 5
H = Highly Critical = 4
I = Critical = 3
J = Moderately Critical = 2
K = Minimally Critical = 1
L = Noncritical =
0-5 = Sensitivity/Criticalness Levels





A.l Threat: Internal flooding
Examples:
Water or steam pipes in walls or ceilings adjacent
to the data center burst, causing flooding and/or
corrosion from water and steam.
Water chiller pipes used for equipment cooling
burst or leak, flooding and/or shorting electrical
components.
The sewer system serving adjacent lavatory facili-
ties backs up, spilling water and sewage into the
data center.
A wet-pipe sprinkler head in the computer room mal-
functions or is accidentally knocked loosed, dis-
charging high-pressure water into the data center.
A. 2 Threat: External flooding
Examples:
Runoff from rains accompanying hurricanes or other
storms overloads storm drains, flooding below-
ground-level data centers.
Rooftop cooling towers for air conditioning on
water storage tanks for fire suppression burst or
leak, flooding floors beneath them.
Coastal or lakefront areas are flooded by tsunami
or tidal wave activity.
Water buildup on flat roofs leaks into lower
floors.
A. 3 Threat: External fire
Examples:
Fire in another part of the facility housing the
data center spreads to the equipment area or makes
access to the data center impossible.
Fire in the supporting utility area is carried by
the air-handling system to the DP area.
Fire in the building's electrical system, while not
directly involving the data center, makes the data
center inoperable through loss of power.
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A. 4 Threat: Internal fire
Examples:
Improperly installed wiring in wiring closets or
under raised flooring starts a fire.
Careless use or storage of combustible materials,
such as paint, solvents, or cleaners, results in
fire.
Careless use of matches, lighters, or smoking
materials ignites flammable materials
—
paper stock,
plastics, and oxide-based materials, such as
magnetic tapes and disks.
A. 5 Threat: Seismic damage
Examples
:
Even relatively small tremors cause head crashes or
other vibrational damage.
Tremors cause structural failure, resulting in the
collapse of walls, ceilings, and floors (even small
tremors can do this to internal construction, such
as raised floors and suspended ceilings, within the
data center)
.
Seismic vibration causes bursting of water pipes,
damage to HVAC equipment, and disruption of elec-
trical service.
A. 6 Threat: Wind damage
Examples:
Hurricanes or tornadoes may cause structural
failure of the facility, resulting in major damage
to system components.
In facilities with exterior windows, the sudden
cyclonic low pressure associated with tornadoes
shatters windows with explosive effect, causing
severe injury to personnel and serious damage to
equipment.
A. 7 Threat: Snow and/or ice storms
Examples:
Excessive snow accumulation on rooftops causes
structural collapse.
Ice accumulation on power supply causes cable
failure, resulting in power outage.
Impassable roads prevent essential personnel from
reporting for normal work schedule.
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B.O ACCIDENTAL THREATS: TECHNICAL
B.l Threat: Power failure/fluctuation
Examples:
Facilities without adequate power conditioning
(filtering) experience equipment damage or destruc-
tion of data as the result of spikes or surges
caused by the introduction of large quantities of
additional power, such as lightning strikes.
The power utility experiences total failure.
Facilities with inadequate uninterruptible power
sources experience data loss during power reduc-
tions (brownouts) by the utility.
The internal distribution system (e.g., transform-
er) fails, denying the facility electrical power.
B.2 Threat: Heating, ventilating, air conditioning failure
Examples :
Environmental control systems malfunction, causing
the temperature in equipment areas to exceed safe
ranges for operation, resulting in erratic equip-
ment performance, damage to equipment and data, for
fire.
Improper or inadequate preventive maintenance of
HVAC equipment (e.g., failure to change filters or
to recharge freon) causes erratic performance of
equipment failure.
HVAC systems have inadequate capacity to handle
periodic extremes of temperature or humidity.
System enhancements made without adequate consider-
ation to existing HVAC capacity cause degradation
of service or failure from system overload.
B.3 Threat: Failure of communication circuits
Examples :
Circuits are physically destroyed by natural
disaster or vandalism.
Excessive noise or crosstalk on telephone company
lines garbles messages during transmission.
Natural phenomena (e.g., sunspots) disrupt micro-
wave and satellite communications.
Excessive demand for existing circuits causes
queuing and routing problems.
Malfunction or failure of switching hardware at
telephone company central office causes failure to
establish switched circuit or misrouting of message
traffic.
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B.4 Threat: Failure of communications hardware/ firmware
Examples:
Failure of switching in a store-and-forward network
results in lost message traffic.
Failure of communications controllers, modems,
cryptographic devices, or digital switches causes
service denial.
B.5 Threat: Failure of communications software
Examples:
Software in a network front-end processor fails
during authentication, data validation, error
detection/correction, polling, or other activity,
resulting in errors, lost or changed messages, or
service denial.
B.6 Threat: Malfunction or failure of CPU, mass storage, or
I/O devices
Examples:
Malfunction or failure of system hardware
components during input, processing, or output
destroys critical data or denies service to system
users.
Inadequately trained operators damage critical
components.
Improper/ inadequate maintenance causes hardware
failure.
Hardware delivered by the vendor does not perform
to specification or fails because of improper manu-
facture or installation.
Perfoirmance characteristics and reliability have
been misrepresented by vendor.
B.7 Threat: Malfunction or failure of systems software
Examples:
Operating systems, data base management systems,
and the like malfunction or fail, causing modifica-
tion of data, lapse of system control, or service
denial
.
Local system programmers improperly design enhance-
ments to systems software.
Vendor-released software changes are improperly
installed and inadequately tested prior to
operational use.
Attempts by users to circumvent access control
mechanisms cause operating system to crash.
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B.8 Threat: Malfunction or failure of applications software
Examples:
Application packages inadequately tested prior to
implementation allow logical errors to be
introduced to operational systems.
Changes are made to applications without a concur-
rent change to user documentation, run books, and
job setup procedures, causing program errors.
Poor logical design of software (because of inade-
quate specification and program verification)
results in program malfunction or failure.
B.9 Threat: Electromagnetic interference (EMI)
Examples:
Radio transmitters and radar units (both ground and
airborne) in the proximity of the facility inter-
fere with operations.
The introduction of televisions, CB radios, and
other electronic equipment into the data center
changes bit configurations in core.
Static electricity from carpeting causes accidental
erasure of data on magnetic media.
B.IO Threat: Electromagnetic emanations
Examples:
Conventional telephone instruments, lamps, radios,
and other electrical devices act as transmitters
and radiate electromagnetic signals.
Improperly grounded equipment, electrical junction
boxes, and cable troughs turn the entire building
into an antenna for the transmission of signals.
CO ACCIDENTAL THREATS: HUMAN
C.l Threat: Data entry error
Examples:
Careless data entry operators miskey data during
input.
Careless handling of source documents results in
dual entry of the same transaction.
Data entry operator fails to enter data from a
source document.
Entry errors cause processing errors, halts, or
output errors.
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C.2 Threat: Improper handling of sensitive data
Examples
:
Source documents for sensitive transactions (e.g.
,
check posting, authorization of payment vouchers)
are inadequately safeguarded to prevent fraudulent
modification or substitution prior to entry into
the system.
Passwords/user IDs are not properly safeguarded:
they are written on a terminal or desk blotter,
passed to other users for convenience, and so on.
Data control clerks do not require that all output
be signed for by the user.
Sensitive output or tapes are left unattended in
offices, reception areas, or terminal rooms.
C.3 Threat: Unauthorized physical access
Examples:
Laxity or lack of training on the part of data
center personnel permits access to the facility by
unauthorized personnel.
Visitors are not properly escorted while in the
facility.
Maintenance personnel and vendor representatives
who frequently visit the facility are allowed
unescorted access (even though this is not
authorized)
.
Former employees retain or obtain possession of
combinations, keys, magnetic access cards, and
other means of access.
C.4 Threat: Accidental damage to hardware, software, or
data
Excimples
Inexperienced or careless operators clear memory
locations without properly backing up data or
programs.
Operators attempt to fix abends on production
shifts without calling software support personnel,
damaging production programs or data.
Inexperienced or improperly trained programmers use
systems software "hooks" to enter supervisor state
to apply quick fixes to software problems, damaging
systems software or data.
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D.O MALICIOUS THREATS
D.l Threat: Malicious damage/destruction of physical assets
Examples:
Radical group destroys the data center for
ideological reasons.
Data center is vandalized.
Disgruntled employee seeking vengeance destroys or
sabotages system resources.
D.2 Threat: Malicious damage/destruction of software or
data
Examples:
Software or data is damaged or destroyed as part of
a planned assault on system resources or as random
vandalism.
Disgruntled employee erases data files and/or
program files.
System penetrators destroy data files.
D.3 Threat: Unauthorized access to data/theft of data
Examples
:
System programmers, operators, auditors, managers,
or other persons in sensitive positions circumvent
access control procedures to obtain information for
their own benefit or that of a third party.
Penetrators successfully circumvent access control
mechanisms and gain access to sensitive data files.
Sensitive data transmittal in unencrypted form is
monitored and its content made available to
unauthorized persons.
A program masquerades as the log-on subroutine and
illicitly obtains passwords and user IDs.
Programs mimic device identification of legitimate
output devices (CRTs, printers, etc.), causing
restricted data to be output to unauthorized
devices.
D.4 Threat: Unauthorized modification of software of
hardware
Examples:
A "trapdoor" program is inserted in systems soft-
ware to bypass operating system controls and allow
clandestine entry into supervisory mode while
simultaneously suppressing any record of mode
entry
.
A "Trojan horse" code module is inserted in a
critical application program to perform an
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unauthorized act (e.g. , credit an account, disre-
gard a debit entry, write a check) without appear-
ing on the audit trail.
Firmware security modules are covertly replaced
with modules that negate firmware implementation of
security controls.
D.5 Threat: Fraudulent generation or modification of data
Examples:
Data is modified to cover evidence of poor perform-
ance, incompetence, or prior illicit behavior.
Sales figures are inflated to increase perfonnance
statistics.
Inventory is understated for purposes of tax
evasion.
Assets are overstated for purposes of manipulating
a loan application.
Data is modified to conceal bribery of an official
or other illegal activities.
Fraudulent payments are generated.





A.l 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3,
2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11
A.
2
1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.1, 2.3,
2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11













B.l 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4,
2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10
B.2 1.3
B.3 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11,
2.12, 2.13
B.4 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10
B.5 2.4, 2.6, 2.8, 3.3
B.6 2.1,2.2,2.3,2.8
B.7 3.1, 3.2, 3.4
B.8 4.1
B.9 1.1, 1.5, 2.2, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 3.1,
B.IO 1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7,
2.8, 2.9
C.l 3.5, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.2
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C.2 2.2, 2.3, 2.8, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 4.1,
4.2, 4.3, 5.1, 5.2, 5.2, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6,
5.7
C.3 All assets threatened
C.4 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8,
2.9, 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 3.1, 3.2,
3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, 5.2,
5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7
D.l 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3,
2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11,
2.12, 2.13, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6,
5.7
D.2 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5, 3.5, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3,
D.3 1.5, 2.2, 2.3, 2.8, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13,
D.4 2.1, 2.4, 2.8, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5,
5.1, 5.4, 5.5
D.5 2.3, 2.4, 2.8, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 3.5,
4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5,
5.6, 5.7
SOURCE: Ref. 26: p. II-3-5.
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APPENDIX G
ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE OF ESTIMATED IMPACT AND FREQUENCY
IMPACT
:
$10, let i = 1
$100, let i = 2








Once in 300 years, let f = 1
Once in 3 years, let f = 2
Once in 3 years, let f = 3
Once in 100 days, let f = 4
Once in 10 days, let f = 5
Once per day, let f = 6
10 times per day, let f = 7
100 times per day, let f = 8
SOURCE: Ref. 43: p. 3E-7.
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1. Electronic Access Control Systems (EACs)
Install electronic systems to control and monitor physical
access to all restricted areas within the data center.
These systems generally consist of a small CPU containing
access control tables, which journals and records access
information, plus personal identification and authentication
(PI&A) devices that identify users to the system. Among the
PI&A technologies currently used as part of EACs are the
following:
1.1 • Magnetic card/badge readers—These mediate access
based on reading a magnetically encoded badge or
card; often used in conjunction with electronic
cipher pads and other PI&A technologies. Proce-
dures for the control of cards and badges should be
developed.
1.2 • Biometric devices—These devices measure certain
physical characteristics of an individual; they
include hand geometry readers, fingerprint
analyzers.
1.3 • Voice Recognition Units—Digitized voice input is
compared with stored digital voice signature data.
1.4 • Signature Analysis—Stored digitized handwriting
sample is compared with signature obtained from
user when entry is desired.
2. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)
Use these devices to detect and monitor unauthorized entry
into restricted areas. IDSs use several technologies that
are suited to particular protection situations.
2.1 • Passive infrared—The presence of intruders is
detected from the thermal radiation emitted by the
human body. Use for surveillance of doors,
windows, and enclosed areas.
2.2 • Active infrared—Infrared beam is projected across
area to contact a light-sensitive cell; hidden
mirrors allow the beam to crisscross the area.
Movement is detected by a break in the beam. Use
for surveillance of passage ways, other large
areas.
2.3 • Ultrasonic systems—These flood an area with
ultrasonic radiation and detect intruders from
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changes in wave patterns. Use for large enclosed
areas.
2.4 • Sonic systems—Sensors installed on walls,
ceilings, floors detect any sounds in enclosed
areas. Use where there is a minimum of extraneous
noise.
2.5 • Magnetic contacts—Contact alarms form an
electrical circuit. Breaking the circuit (as in
opening a door or window) activates an alarm. Use
on doors, windows, file cabinets.
2.6 • Vibration sensors—These detect vibrations caused
by breaking glass or attempts to break through a
wall, floor, or ceiling.
2.7 • Microwave systems—Similar to ultrasonic systems,
these systems emit high-frequency radio waves that
are transmitted by and partly reflected back to
antenna. The frequency changes when the waves
strike a moving object.
3. Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Prevention
High-energy electromagnetic radiation, such as that given
off by TV transmitters, microwave equipment, and high-
powered UHF/VHF transmitters, may alter bit settings in core
or change data stored on magnetic media. Precautions should
be taken to prevent damage from EMI by:
3.1 • Locating equipment away from high-energy sources
.
3.1 • Proper grounding of all equipment.
3.3 • Exclusion of radios, TVs, microwave ovens, and
other non-DP-related electronic devices from
equipment areas.
4 . Fire Detection and Alarm Systems
All DP facilities should be equipped with adequate fire
detection and alarm systems, as specified by National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 75[4]. Two basic
technologies are used:
4.1 • Smoke detectors—Photocell or ionization-type
devices should be installed in:
—Equipment areas
—Spaces above false ceilings
—Areas beneath raised flooring
—Tape libraries
—Forms and supply storage areas
—
-Office areas and passageways
4.2 • Heat detectors—Two types are generally used:
rate-of-rise and temperature threshold. Rate-of-
rise detectors should be installed in:
—Areas beneath raised flooring
—Electrical closets and in electricity-generating
areas
Temperature-threshold sensors should be used in:
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—Tape libraries
—Forms and supply storage areas
—Office areas and passageways
All detectors should be integrated with an alarm system that
is visible as well as audible. Alarm annunciation should be
both local and at a fire station or central fire/security
control center.
5. Fire Suppression Systems
All facilities should have both automatic and manual fire
suppression systems:
• Automatic systems—These are activated automatical-
ly as a result of detector activation:
5.1 Water sprinkler—Provides continuous suppres-
sion as long as water source is available.
Only dry-pipe systems, which are not charged
with water until a heat/fire/ smoke detector is
activated, should be used.
5.2 Halon 1301—One-shot systems with no
continuous suppression after initial; elimi-
nate danger of water damage.
5.3 CO2—Not for use in areas where personnel are
present. Effective for under-floor suppres-
sion or in areas with potential for electrical
fires (e.g., electrical closets, generator
areas)
.
5.4 Manual systems—Hand-held extinguishers of CO2
or Halon 1301 or 1211.
6. Emergency Power
Equip the facility with battery- or automatic generator-,
driven emergency power. System capacity should be suffi-
cient to power the following minimum essential systems for
4 8 hours:
• Electrically activated door locks.
• Fire detection and suppression systems.
• Intrusion detection and alarm systems.
• Intercoms and internal telephone systems.
7. Emergency Lighting
Equip facility with battery- or automatic generator-powered
emergency lighting in the data center, passageways, and
stairwells, and at all emergency exists. All units should
begin immediate operation when power fails and allow
sufficient time for an orderly evacuation of the facility.
8. Facility Location
The physical location of a facility, both geographically and
within a larger structure, can have a major effect on its




—Out of floor plains, earthquake zones, landslide
areas, hurricane or typhoon zones, and tornado-
prone areas.
—Away from high-crime areas.
—Away from high levels of high-frequency microwave
or radio transmissions (e.g., airports, microwave
relay sites)
.
—Far enough away from highways, railways, and
heavy construction to avoid damage from vibration.
—Away from flammable or explosive material storage
areas.
• Location within a structure
—Above ground level.
—
'Below the top floor.
—In the interior of the building away from
exterior windows.
9. Facility Construction
Construct the DP facility in accordance with existing fire
and occupational health and safety standards. Pay particu-
lar attention to ensuring that:
• The facility is constructed of fireproof material
in accordance with the National Fire Code, NFPA
70[4].
• The facility is windowless, or existing windows are
secured with steel screening or louvers, and all
are alarmed.
• The facility has adequate emergency exits and
egress signalling in accordance with NFPA standards
[4].
• The facility uses architectural features such as
man-traps and single access points to enhance
overall security.
• The facility provides adequate space for proper
equipment installation, cable troughs, ducting, and
other adjuncts of data processing.
10. Housekeeping Standards
Maintain basic standards of housekeeping within the data
center.
• Prohibit eating, drinking, and smoking in equipment
and forms of storage areas.
• Keep the area under the raised flooring clean and
free of dirt and trash.
• Empty trash receptacles regularly.
• All DP personnel should be held responsible for a
clean working environment.




Because heating/ventilating/air conditioning systems are
crucial to the basic functioning of DP department, certain
basic steps must be taken to ensure the uninterrupted
functioning of these systems. These steps should include:
• Regular maintenance of all HVAC equipment.
• Multiple heat-pump/chiller units with sufficient
capacity to provide backup in case of unit failure.
• Use of HVAC systems dedicated to DP operations—not
supporting any other functions within the facility.
• Temperature/humidity alarms to warn of
environmental control problems.
12. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)
CCTV used in conjunction with video tape recording (VTR)
equipment is a powerful security monitoring tool and an
effective deterrent. Useful CCTV for surveillance of:
• Unattended terminals and other sensitive equipment.
• Facility entranceways.
• Internal passageways and stairwells.
• Supporting utilities (e.g., HVAC areas, telephone
wiring closets)
.
In multiplexed systems (using more than one camera per
monitor) , ensure that the camera-to-monitor ratio does not
exceed five to one. If cameras are not constantly monitored
by guard force personnel, they should be equipped with VTRs
at a ratio of no more than five to one.
13. Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)
Provide an uninterruptible power supply of sufficient
capacity to allow for graceful system shutdown in the event
of power failure, through use of:
• A battery system that provides enough time to dump
files and bring the system down.
• A combination battery/generator system, in which
the battery provides sufficient backup until the




Segregate the data center into various control zones based
on sensitivity (e.g.
,
tape library, DASD area) and issue
color-coded badges identifying the areas to which personnel
are authorized access. These badges can be used in lieu of
in conjunction with an electronic access control system.
Develop procedures for issuing, controlling, and retrieving
the badges.
15. Control of Chilled Water Supply
Ensure that:
• Pumps used for chilled water distribution are in a
physically secure area.
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• There is an alternative source of chilled water in
the event that the primary source fails.
• Chilled water pipes are adequately insulated to
prevent condensation build-up and leakage onto
equipment.
16. Secure Air Intake Ducts
Ensure that unauthorized persons cannot enter the data
center by crawling through air intake ducts, using alarmed
tamperproof grates.
17. Secure HVAC Equipment
Install HVAC equipment in a physically secured location.
18 . Secure UPS and Motor Generator Equipment
Ensure that UPS and motor generator equipment are in
physically secured location.
19 . Secure Electrical Distribution Panel
Ensure that the electrical distribution panel is in an area
physically secure from access by unauthorized persons.
20. Emergency Power Shut-Off
Equip facility with an automatic power shut-off that will
kill all electrical power to equipment upon activation of
any smoke or heat detector in the facility. In addition,
install manual shut-down switches at all fire exits.
21. Floor Lifters
Provide floor lifters wherever hand-held fire extinguishers
are placed.
22. Hand-Held Extinguishers
Mount hand-held extinguishers (preferably Halon 1211)




Ensure that all curtains, carpeting, furniture, raised
flooring, false ceilings, insulating material, and so on are
made of noncombustible materials or are treated with fire-
retardant materials.
24. Waterproof Covers
Equip the computer room with waterproof equipment covers to
prevent damage from flooding or sprinkler discharge.
Develop written procedures outlining the use of the covers
and ensure that personnel are familiar with them.
25. Water Detectors
Install water detectors under raised flooring and around
water chiller units and pipes.
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26. Under-Flood Drainage
Provide adequate drains under raised flooring areas around
water chiller units and pipes. Regularly inspect drains to
make sure they are open and free of trash.
27. Watertight Ceilings
Ensure that ceilings are sealed and watertight to prevent
damage from water leaking from higher floors.
28. Visitor Control
Treat all personnel not requiring regular access to the
facility as visitors. Visitor-control procedures should
include:
28.1 • Issuance of a distinctive badge that identifies the
wearer as a visitor.
28.2 • Requiring all visitors to sign in and out of the
facility on a visitor log. Logs should be checked
at the end of each shift to ensure that all
visitors are accounted for.
28.3 • Requiring visitors to be escorted at all times
while in the facility.
29. Vendor Personnel Control
Control access by vendor personnel, such as customer
engineers and maintenance technicians, by having them:
29.1 • Undergo the same background screening as other
personnel with access to the same facilities and
systems.
29.2 * Issued contractor badges. Replacement personnel
sent by the vendor, however, should be treated as
visitors until receipt of proper access
authorization.
30. Backup-Media Security
Take adequate physical security measures to safeguard backup
magnetic media (disks and tapes) during both transit to off-
site storage and storage at the remote site. These measures
include:
• Moving media to off-site storage in double-locked
containers under dual control.
• Written procedures covering the authorization of
personnel to perform the transfer.
• Continuous receipting at both the point of origin
and the destination.
• Providing the same level of physical protection at
the off-site location at the primary site.
31. Destruction of Sensitive Output
Provide adequate written procedures and equipment (e.g.,
degaussers, pulpers, paper shredders, incinerators) for the
destruction of sensitive printouts, carbons, microfiche, and
other human-readable media; and ensure that they are used.
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32. Guard Force
Use a guard force (whether organizational personnel or a
professional group) to provide 2 4-hour~a-day control of
entry and egress to the facility in which the data center is
housed, the date center area, equipment areas, and other
areas of especially high sensitivity (e.g., tape library,
DASD area) .
33. Limit Entry/Egress Points
Permit all entry and egress to the data center, equipment
areas, and media library only through a single point
controlled by an electronic access control system, locking
devices, and/or guard surveillance. This can be accomplish-
ed very efficiently by the use of a double door, with one
door opening inward for entry, the other outward for egress.
34. Media Library Procedures
Establish a magnetic media library, and develop written
procedures for library operation: a procedures manual for
using any automated tape management system, a regular
schedule of tape cleaning/maintenance, and procedures for
movement of backup media to and from off-site storage (see
also Countermeasure 30) . A retention schedule for data
stored on magnetic media, accountability for new media and
the retirement of old media from active service, and an
inventory of magnetic media should also be detailed.
Although the size of the operation will determine the size,
staffing, and organization of the library, certain minimum
procedures should be followed in all cases:
34.1 * Lock all data and program files in a fire-resistant
room or container when not actually in use. Access
should be limited to authorized personnel only.
34.2 * Develop sign-in/sign-out procedures to account for
all media.
34.3 * Have a media librarian present on all shifts. If
only one librarian is employed or the function is
performed by a member of the operations staff on a
part-time basis, control access to media by dual
custody of lock combination/keys.
35. DP Security Training
Establish a DP training program for all personnel, covering
such areas as:
• Organizational security policy—All employees
should be aware of the organization's security
policy and their responsibility to protect data and
other resources from misuse, theft, or destruction.
• Security operating procedures—Train employees in
day-to-day procedures for handling sensitive
data/programs, conducting security checks, and
maintaining the security and integrity of systems
and facilities.
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• Access control procedures—Delineate the types and
levels of access to facilities and systems, access
control systems in use, and escort policy and
procedures.
• Security incident procedures—Discuss the handling
of bomb threats, riots/disturbances, unauthorized
personnel in controlled areas, and emergency
reporting and response.
36. Insurance
Purchase insurance to lessen the financial impact of
physical loss, computer fraud, and malpractice. Among the
types of coverage that should be considered are:
• Property Damage—Insurance can be obtained to cover
the damage or destruction of facilities, systems,
data, programs, and other tangible assets. Accep-
table levels of loss retention should be
established.
• Fidelity Coverage—Most organizations can obtain
fidelity coverage to indemnify them against
fraudulent acts (including computer fraud) by
employees.
• Business interruption—In addition to property
damage, the coverage should be sufficient to
indemnify the organization for loss of revenues
resulting from damage to or destruction of DP
resources.
• Third-Party Penetration—New coverage indemnifies
the organization against the penetration and
manipulation of DP or communications systems for
fraudulent purposes by persons not employed by the
organization.
• Errors and Omissions—Coverage is available that
insures against loses caused by errors and omis-
sions on the part of employees and contractors.
37. Shock-Mounting Equipment
In areas of seismic activity, install disk drives and other
vibration-sensitive equipment on free-floating shock mounts
to minimize the vibration damage.
38. Balanced Circuits for Security Systems
All electrically activated security systems should operate
on a balanced circuit designed to detect a ±10 percent
change in line current, and thus prevent covert disablement
of security systems by intruders.
39. Emergency Action Training
Establish an emergency action training program to ensure
that all personnel are thoroughly familiar with their duties
and responsibilities during emergencies. This training
should be given to all employees within two weeks of
103
starting employment and refresher programs should be





• Power outages/ failures
• Emergency first aid, including CPR.
PERSONNEL SECURITY CONTROLS
40. Data Classification Standards
Develop data classification standards to determine which
data processed or stored by automated systems requires addi-
tional protection beyond that normally provided. The
sensitivity or criticality of data should be examined in
three areas during a formal evaluation process:
• Proprietary—Data that provides the organization
with an advantage over competitors or whose disclo-
sure might expose the organization to fraud.
• Privacy—Data that is covered by current or antici-
pated privacy legislation or that should not be
disclosed for legal or ethical reasons.
• Criticality—The importance of given data to the
organization's operations (generally described as a
function of how long the organization could afford
to be without access to it)
.
Levels of classification (e.g., internal use only, company
secret) should be developed; the degree of protection
afforded data and the level of access allowed should be a
function of this classification.
41. Position-Sensitivity Levels
Evaluate the sensitivity of DP positions within the organi-
zation to determine the permissable level of access to
sensitive data as well as the depth of background checking
that must accompany the hiring of an individual. The sensi-
















—Data administrator/data base manager
—Customer engineer/maintenance engineer





—I/O control/data control clerks
4 2 . Background Checks
Conduct background checks for all personnel in sensitive DP
positions, basing the thoroughness of the check on the level
of job sensitivity:
• Level 1—Extremely/highly sensitive
—Polygraph/psychological stress analysis (where
legal; see also Countermeasures 51 and 52)















43. Security Briefing/Nondisclosure Statement
Give all new personnel within the DP function a detailed
security briefing before they start work. This briefing
should describe the security aspects of the organization's
operations and delineate organizational security procedures,
including reporting of security incidents and general and
specific security responsibilities. After briefing, all new
employees should execute a nondisclosure statement
certifying that:
• They have been informed of and understand their
security responsibilities.
• They understand the disciplinary and legal
penalties associated with unauthorized use of
resources or disclosure of data.
44. Personnel Rotation
Rotate personnel involved in sensitive duties. Not only
does rotation broaden the individual's knowledge of the
operation and provide highly desirable cross-training for
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purposes of backup, it also helps deter the possibility of
fraud based on collusion. In addition, it serves to prevent
individuals from becoming locked-in to a particular position
by providing professional challenge and job stimulation.
Persons in boring and/or repetitive jobs (data entry and
data control, for example) should be rotated to ensure that
they do not feel or become stagnant and to enhance morale.
Personnel left in the same tedious job for long periods may
become disgruntled or careless, resulting in willful or
inadvertent errors and omissions.
45. Mandatory Leave of Absence
Require all personnel in sensitive areas to take a stipu-
lated leave of absence (at least two consecutive weeks) each
year. This allows pending transactions to clear and helps
to identify and isolate potential fraud.
46. Proper Management and Supervision
The success or failure of any security program can be traced
to employee attitudes toward both security and the organiza-
tion itself. There is a clear correlation between employee
dissatisfaction and the incidence of employee carelessness,
theft, fraud, or other misconduct. Management should
therefore address a number of issues, including:
• Work environment—Make sure that work spaces and
conditions reflect management's concern for
employee well-being and productivity (see Counter-
measure 10) . Provide adequate lighting,- in terms
of the number and type of units, proper dispersal
and placement, and prompt replacement of burned-out
or defective units. Noise suppression should
include carpeting; acoustical tiles, baffles,
paneling, and equipment covers. Provide adequate
ventilation and proper temperature and humidity
(see Countermeasure 11) and effective fire detec-
tion and suppression equipment (see Countermeasures
4 and 5) . Exits should be appropriately marked and
easily accessible.
• Professional Growth—Challenge and growth are major
motivating factors for DP professionals (as well as
for other employees) . Encourage employees to par-
ticipate in professional organizations and to
continue their education, through both external
training and in-house professional development
seminars.
• Performance Evaluations—Use frequent informal per-
formance evaluations to give employees feedback on
job performance and to offer them a chance to
express their feelings about the working environ-
ment and their own career progress. Evaluations
can also uncover potential problem areas before
they become serious.
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• Personal incentives—Consider instituting security
award programs to reward employees who report
theft, fraud, or other unauthorized use or
manipulation of DP resources; such programs can
become part of the performance evaluation.
• Detection and deterrence—Organizations whose
employees believe they are likely to be caught if
they engage in unauthorized activities experience a
significantly lower level of theft and fraud. The
more severe the reaction of management and co-
workers, the lower the number of incidents (co-
worker sanctions are particularly effective)
.
• Grievance Procedures—Establish fair and equitable
grievance procedures and administer them impartial-
ly. Management at all levels should be attentive
to grievances and act promptly on those that are
justified.
• Awareness of personal problems—Be alert to major
changes in the personal as well as work habits of
subordinates. Such changes frequently signal an
increased potential for fraud, misuse of resources,
or disclosure of sensitive data. Changes in
attendance patterns, evidence of alcohol and/or
drug abuse, an inordinately high standard of living
in relation to salary, severe indebtedness, and
similar changes may indicate serious personal prob-
lems. Managers should investigate the causes of
these problems and use all available organizational
mechanisms to provide effective and timely
assistance.
47 . Termination Procedures
Upon notification to or by the employee of an intention to
teirminate employment, the supervisor should immediately:
• Notify the DP security officer and the personnel
department of the pending termination.
• Request cancellation of all passwords/user IDs to
which the employee has access, and have the
employee turn in all keys, documentation, manuals,
and other organizational material in his or her
possession.
• Relieve the employee of all responsibilities
involving sensitive data or programs and provide
nonsensitive work instead. If nonsensitive work is
unavailable, the employee should be relieved of all
duties. Further access by the employee to the
premises should be as a visitor and controlled as
such.
The DP security officer should immediately:
• Cancel all passwords/user IDs pertaining to the
employee.
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• Change cryptographic keys or authentication codes
to which the employee has had access.
• Brief the employee on his or her continuing legal
responsibility to protect sensitive proprietary
data after termination of employment. Have the
employee execute a security termination/nondisclo-
sure statement signifying his or her understanding
of these responsibilities.
48. Formal Position Description
Develop foirmal position descriptions that incorporate levels
of sensitivity and the need to restrict access to data and
programs; describe the scope, content, and specific duties
of each position. The descriptions provide personnel with a
clear delineation of their duties; they also provide the
organization with a standard against which individual
performance can be measured.
49. Separation of Duties
Use the two-man principle by involving several people in the
performance of sensitive duties. Such separation makes
fraud more difficult by increasing the number of individuals
who must be party to the fraud, and it provides an important
error-checking and quality-control function. Separation of





-Programmers may not both specify and write a
procedure.
—Programmers may not write and test the same
procedure.
—Programmers may not develop and maintain the same
procedure
.
—Programmers may not write a procedure and main-
tain that procedure in the program library.
--Programmers may not write a procedure and then
execute it in a production mode.
—Programmers may not control any transfers between
programmer development libraries and production
libraries.
• Operators:
—Operators may not make changes to application or
system software.
—Operators may not have access to source code or
source listings. Access to all other documentation
should be on a strict need-to-know basis as
required for actual processing.
—Operators may perform no balancing activities
except those necessary for run-to-run controls.
—Operators may execute only programs scheduled
through the established proper procedures.
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—Operators may not execute data or software-modi-
fying system utilities (e.g., IBM's SUPERZAP) with-
out proper authorization and dual control.
—Operators may not execute programs from text
libraries during production runs.
—Operators may not override internal labels
without supervisory approval.
• Users:
—Data entry personnel may not prepare source
documents for input.
—Someone other than the input operator must verify
all data input, unless programmatically verified.
—The same person may not perform input and output
duties.
—The same person may not post and balance general
ledger and other sensitive entries.
—
^The person who prepared the original transaction-
may not prepare rejects or nonreads for reentry.
—Master file and other sensitive transaction
changes must be under dual control.
50. Preemployment Suitability Testing
Use preemployment suitability testing. These tests, which
can be quickly and easily given to applicants, do not vio-
late the legal prohibitions present in many states on the
use of polygraphs or psychological stress analyzers in pre-
employment screening (see Countermeasures 51 and 52) . Field
experience has shown that a high percentage of applicants
who fail these tests have a history of theft, drug or
alcohol abuse, or emotional instability.
51. Psychological Stress Evaluation (PSE)
PSE equipment measures the level of stress present in a sub-
ject's voice. Measuring this stress level is said to enable
determination of whether an applicant is answering questions
truthfully in preemployment interviewing. Use of this tech-
nique, however, has raised legal and ethical questions, and




Polygraphs measure the electrical conductivity of the skin.
They have been used during the past 2 years to give some
indication of the truthfulness of answers to questions posed
during an interview. Serious questions have been raised
regarding their accuracy, however, and many states have






In installations that do not use conditional power, equip
all DP hardware with power filters to prevent damage to
hardware or data from power surges and spikes.
54 Minicomputer-Based Hardware Monitors
Use minicomputer-based hardware monitors for the collection
and analysis of large quantities of data in real time
without placing excessive overhead on the operating system.
Security personnel can thus constantly monitor and analyze
system activity without degrading the speed and quality of
processing. Use of an independent security monitor also
makes the system far less vulnerable to subversion and
unauthorized access, since would-be penetrator must avoid
both the security safeguards of the mainframe and the
surveillance of the external monitor. Illegal requests or
those inconsistent with the terminal's authority, excessive
log-on failures, and attempts to use deactivated but still
resident software should be monitored and logged.
55. Hardware-Generated CPU Identification Code
The system uses a hardware-generated code that identifies a




This system uses a clock word in memory that can be read
(but not written) by user programs; it is essential for
logging, since it gives the capability of affixing a time
stamp to a message or transaction.
57 Ring Architecture
In this form of system architecture, data and/or programs
are organized into a fixed number of hierarchically ordered
rings. The higher the number of the ring, the lower the
level of privilege; ring zero is the highest level of
privilege. User programs executing within a given ring are
then granted access to segments in rings at their own or a
lower level of privilege (i.e., a higher-numbered ring),
protecting segments in lower-numbered rings. Illegal
instructions should cause an interrupt.
58. Capability-Based Architecture
This architecture requires that each program maintain a
table of absolute addresses of all segments it has the
authority to access. A program is then said to have the
capability of accessing these segments. When a program
requests a segment, the executive checks its access privi-
leges; if access is authorized, the program is given the




Prohibition of Unspecified Operation Codes
The system recognizes all allowable operation codes; those
unspecified are denied execution.
60. Memory-Clearing Instructions
An operating system function is used to overwrite with zeros
all areas of core memory and/or mass storage used by a
program, after program execution and before releasing
storage for reuse.
61. Segmentation
This scheme, in which the architecture supports segmenta-
tion, is similar to paging except that variable-length
blocks of memory are used. Thus, a program can define
logical blocks of memory (modules) to constitute segments.
This decreases the frequency of swapping, since once a
module is brought into main memory, it usually remains there
until it finishes execution and exits. Segment tables store
the origin and length of each segment, permitting the
sharing of segments between multiple users. These tables
also control user access to shared resources.
62 Paging
Mass storage is subdivided by hardware/software into pages
of equal size; these are then used as an extension of main
memory. Memory mapping using resident tables and hardware
registers is then performed to map the program's virtual
memory space with its physical location, which will gener-
ally be divided between main memory and mass storage. A
page fault occurs when a program attempts to fetch or store
data not resident in main memory. The page containing the
desired virtual address is located and its contents swapped
into main memory.
63. Storage Locks and Keys
The architecture uses bit masks to protect specific blocks
of main memory, and the operating system places a lock at
the beginning of each such block of storage. Each operating
program (including the executive) has a key that is kept in
a hardware register. Each program is authorized access only
to those blocks whose locks match this key. The executive
is assigned a key of zero that accesses the locks of all
other operating programs.
64 Memory-Bounds Registers
Memory-bounds registers consist of a base-address register
and an upper-limit register that are loaded by the operating
system when a job is brought into main memory. Each memory
reference by the job is checked to ensure that it neither
exceeds the memory allocated to it nor intrudes on memory
locations allocated to other jobs. There should be an
attribute register for each bounds register. These
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registers contain values that indicate the type and charac-
teristics of the data being stored and protected; they allow
implementation of more complex protection mechanisms (e.g.,
read only, write only) in the hardware.
65. Firmware Implementation of Sensitive Functions
Because of the recognized subvertability of software,
certain critical functions (e.g., access control tables,
sensitive operating system routines) can now be firmware
based (burned into chips) . Execution speeds can be
dramatically increased, and security is enhanced because of
the difficulty of covert firmware modification. Physical
access to firmware, nevertheless, should be limited and
strictly controlled and monitored. Install locks and
counters that show how many times the cabinet has been
opened on all cabinets containing firmware. Regularly
inspect all firmware components for signs of tampering.
66. EMI Containment Procedures
Use electromagnetic interference (EMI) containment proce-
dures to minimize the possibility of compromising emanations
being intercepted. These measures include:
• Use of TEMPEST-approved equipment-^
• Use of EMI shielding material to insulate the room
or the equipment housing.
• Use of internal EMI suppressors on equipment.
67. Physical Control Zone (PCZ)
Establish a PCZ to control EMI and to prevent unauthorized
personnel from entering it to monitor electronic emanations.
The zone should be large enough so that, at its perimeter,
the level of signal strength that can be acquired is less
than 10 microvolts per square meter.
SOFTWARE SECURITY CONTROLS
68 . Life Cycle Approach to Software Development
Use of a life-cycle approach improves management's view of
and control over the software development process. This
methodology defines the various phases of software develop-
ment, implementation, and enhancement, all of which affect
the security of the system, dividing these phases into major
milestones and activities. The major phases in the life
cycle of a software system are:
• Initiation and survey—The goals and benefits of
the project are described and the actual need for
the system determined.
^TEMPEST refers to a government program involving the
building of components that effectively contain emanations.
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• Functional requirements definition—Major user
needs and processing requirements are defined.
• System architecture definition—Various alternative
methods of addressing the functional requirements
are identified and defined.
• User design—The external design of the system
(i.e., how it will appear to the user) is defined,
as are all processing and I/O requirements and the
like.
• System design—High-level user requirements are
translated into specific system requirements, such
as file structure, data base, I/O, data capture,
security and control, and testing.
• Implementation—All designs and plans from the
previous phases are translated into executable
programs that perform in the test environment
according to specification. The entire system is
run through acceptance testing. The system is then
installed as part of the production environment.
• Maintenance—The objective here is to ensure that
each production application performs in an optimum
manner as perceived by users, computer operations,
and systems development.
69. Software Development Methodology
Foirmulate and publish a formal set of software development
standards within the organization. This publication should
take the form of a systems programming and standards manual
applicable to all organizational elements.
Use a structured methodology such as top-down development,
which consists of the following phases:
• Top-down design—Software should be designed so
that it identifies first the major functions to be
accomplished, then the lower functions derived from
these. A tree structure is designed, containing
these subfunctions with the highest level of
control logic in the top segment and control
passing to lower-level segments. This process
continues for as many levels as required until all
subfunctions are included in the structure.
• Top-down implementation—Implementation of the
design produces a top-down hierarchy of subfunc-
tions. No program component is generated until the
component upon which it depends has been produced.
• Top-down testing—The highest-level segment is
tested once it is coded; this segment then exits to
the next-lower segment, which is also tested (if it
has been coded) . Since higher-level segments are
used to exercise lower-level segments, careful
design and planning will ensure that the most
critical subfunctions are also the most tested.
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70. Documentation
Document systems adequately throughout their life cycle so
that all system and program functions are recorded for use
in subsequent design efforts and for support of system
audits. Documents produced during the development or
enhancement of a system and/or program should include:
• Functional description—Prepared during the
definition stage of the system life cycle, this
offers a high-level definition of the functions to
be provided by the operational system. Since the
functional description is used by both technical
and nontechnical personnel, it should contain a
minimum of computerese.
• Data requirements document—This is a technical
document prepared by both development and user
personnel, providing as much detail as possible in
the following areas:
—Input required
—Procedures for providing input to the system
--Expected output
--All uses of standard data elements
--Data limitations of the system
• System/subsystem specification—This technical
document is prepared during the design phase to
guide system personnel during the development of
large projects. It provides more detail concerning
the system environment and design elements than
does the functional description. System/subsystem
interfaces are also defined.
• Program specification—Used to guide program devel-
opment during detailed design, this provides more
detailed data requirements than either the
functional description or the system/subsystem
specification. The program specification is
concerned with only the segments of the description
and specification that can be applied to a
particular program.
• Data base specifications—These documents are pre-
pared for use when many analysts/programmers are
involved in writing programs using the same data.
The specifications must be detailed enough to allow
program coding and data base generation by the
development team.
• User manual—Directed to the system user group, the
manual provides the following guidance:
—General and/or specific information on a given
computer system or program, oriented toward general
management and staff personnel
—Details on providing system input
—Responses required to system requests
--System output procedures and formats
—Instructions for operating peripherals
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• Computer operations manual—This is directed toward
supervisory and control personnel, providing the
detailed operating procedures necessary to
initiate, run, and terminate the system.
• Program maintenance manual—This manual provides
general and specific information about the computer
program for maintenance personnel, offering
detailed technical presentations of computer
programs
.
• Test plan—This provides a mechanism for directing
a comprehensive system testing program, enumerating
test events, schedules, and materials.
• Test analysis report—This describes the
methodology and results of system/program testing.
Establish a master documentation library, with written
procedures to ensure that all documentation contained in it
is current. Control access to the library on a strict need-
to-know basis.
71. Software Quality Assurance
Establish a formal software quality assurance group within
the data processing organization. This group's charter
should stipulate that it reviews all software and related
documents for:
• Accuracy, consistency, and readability
• Conformance to security and control standards
• Conformance to system and program specifications
• Adequacy of documentation
• JCL and other control errors that might create
problems in a production environment
All software products and related documentation should
constitute a reliable and maintainable product.
Conduct a software quality assurance review when:
• A major change is made to any production system
• Any change is made to a critical or sensitive
system
• Any software product from a third-party vendor is
delivered
• A new system development effort is completed
Ensure that all test kits (test programs designed to exer-
cise specific application software systems) are maintained
by quality assurance. Changes to these kits should be per-
formed by quality assurance with input from the systems
development staff.
72. Configuration Management (CM)
Use this technique to control the evolution of the modifica-
tions to a system during its development. Technical and
administrative direction and surveillance should be applied
to identify and document the functional and physical charac-
teristics of hardware and software. CM also controls
115
changes to these characteristics and records and reports
change processing and implementation status, minimizing the
possibility of unauthorized hardware or software
modification.
73. Verification and Validation (V&V)
Use software V&V to ascertain that system requirements are
accurately stated, that the software is being developed in
accordance with the stated specifications, and that in oper-
ation it satisfactorily performs the functions for which it
was designed.
• Verification—This substantiates that requirements,
design, and code are complete and consistent with
each other. It involves the review of all software
life cycle to ensure that they conform to earlier
documents and will ultimately conform to the
requirements
.
• Validation—This confirms the feasibility and
testability of requirements and the correctness of
the design and code. It involves exercising and
analyzing the software to ensure its performance
according to specifications and to discover latent
errors. Validation provides greater guarantees of
a correct system by comparing expected results with
actual system performance when the system is exten-
sively exercised.
74. Chief Programmer Team Concept
Use chief programmer teams to break a large system produc-
tion group into smaller groups to minimize problems and
errors. A programming team consists of a leader and usually
fewer than eight members. The team is given complete
responsibility for a portion of the system and is expected
to produce well-implemented well-defined software for that
portion. Keeping the group small minimizes problems,
especially those of communication.
75. Structured Walkthroughs
Use this technique, in which the designer/author simulates
the execution of the program/system segment in front of a
peer group for their evaluation, to review the logic and
functionality of system and program design prior to actual
testing of code modules. Such reviews are informal and are
usually completed within one or two hours.
76. Program Librarian
Use an operating system containing a program librarian to
provide maintenance of software programs within the system.
The library consists primarily of internal and external
entities. The internal library is maintained in a disk file
and contains the programs and job control statements that
have been generated by the programming team. The external
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library consists of program source listings, test results,
and the like. The librarian function adds, deletes, and
modifies library programs and maintains a record of library
program accesses for use as an audit and surveillance tool.
In an automated environment, interface the library manage-
ment system with access control software to provide data set
protection for library accesses.
77 . Software Documentation Reviews
A software documentation review is an audit and validation
of developed software. Based mainly on the source listings
and any available system documentation, the review and audit
are directed primarily toward software development improve-
ments. The process should increase confidence in the
software and produce a more reliable and maintainable
product. Software documentation review activities fall into
the following four areas:
• Familiarization with and review of the code and
applicable documentation
• Review of software construction and coding
techniques
• Generation of a functional description based on
derived functional requirements and knowledge of
the software
• Analysis of the functional description and its
relationship to the actual implementation.
78. High-Order Languages (HOLs)
Use a high-order language that provides control structure
and/or data structure features, allowing programming to be
done at the abstract and machine-independent level. Such
programming takes less time and produces more readable,
auditable, and maintainable code than does assembly
language. HOLs include FORTRAN, COBOL, ALGOL, PL/1, Pascal,
CMS 2, and Ada.
79. Access Control Software
Use access control software (e.g., RACF, ACF2 , SECURE, SAC,
TOP SECRET) for enhanced control of access to sensitive
data.
80. Internal Tape Labels
Use a tape management system that assigns magnetically
encoded labels and does not rely on external serial numbers
on tape reels. This greatly reduces the possibility of
inadvertently or willfully mounting and running unauthorized
tapes or altering external labels.
81. Data File Encryption
Provide a high level of security to stored sensitive data by
means of file encryption. In this process, data is
encrypted prior to its storage on magnetic media. Theft of
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the medium or unauthorized file access will yield only data
in encrypted form. Authorized users, however, can decrypt
the data at the time of file opening. Unlike link encryp-
tion (see Countermeasure 114) , file encryption is software
rather than hardware based. If a system based on the data
encryption standard (DES) is used, ensure that keys are
stored in encrypted foirm and changed regularly.
82. Automated Code Analysis
Use automated code analysis to validate code in relation to
its specification. This tool is also effective in reviewing
and evaluating software construction and coding techniques
with respect to accepted industry standards and practices.
It can be used to facilitate certification of newly develop-
ed security-related software and to provide fast and accur-
ate auditing of existing programs to detect unauthorized
code modification.
83. Self-Metric Software
Use a software routine that contains embedded code to meter
the performance of specific activities, for example, the
amount of main storage or other system resources accumulated
by the routine's associated processes.
84. Trace Program
Using a trace program to aid in error detection. This diag-
nostic tool is an operating system capability that provides
a sequential record and analysis of each instruction execut-
ed in a program. If files are created, they should be
deleted after program execution. The trace programs should
display the values of variables and program instructions;
they should not change the value of any variable, instruc-
tion, or data, nor should they alter the course of execu-
tion. In some cases, the use of trace programs might itself
be considered a threat, and adequate controls protective
must be placed on all sensitive files that might be accessed
by the trace program (s)
.
85. Time-Out Feature
Ensure that the operating system provides the timing
services required to support a secure operational environ-
ment. Both time-of-day clock and CPU (interval) timer
facilities should be supported. Task management should use
timer services to control and limit CPU use through
scheduling algorithms. Inactive processes, or terminals (in
an interactive environment) should be terminated after a
predetermined period.
8 6 . Threat Monitoring
Ensure that the operating system provides threat-monitoring
information. The system should record data on the following
events as often as the user desires:
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• Unauthorized attempts to enter the system
• All attempts (authorized or unauthorized) to access
protected resources
• All attempts to issue restricted commands
• All attempts to modify profiles on restricted data
The system should route messages to the security console,
and each incident should be recorded on the security
log/audit trail.
87. Security Auditing and Accounting
The system security auditing and accounting capability
should, as a minimum:
• Record all unsuccessful log-on attempts to the
system
• Record all attempts to enter supervisor mode
• Record all attempts to access restricted
schemas/ subschemas
• Record all trapped requests requiring extended
access authorization
• Log all system transactions, including jobs on/off,
with user/terminal/program ID and the date time
group (DTG)
• Log data/files requested and/or accessed, including
access keys and the number and types of access
• Log the disposition of data, including number of
records input/output/displayed and terminals or
logical devices to which data is output.
• Log crashes, machine failures, and restarts
• Log program aborts
• Log changes to security access tables
• Log program library updates
° Log all descriptor changes.
88. Security Labeling
Ensure that the system labels all input/output with security
and/or sensitivity labels and checks routing indicators
before data output. Data objects should be labeled with
security information, and the operating system should check
all labels before processing.
89. Extended Access Checking
Ensure that the system has the capability for an extended
method of access authorization such as an extended handshake
or question and answer (see Countermeasure 117) to restrict
access to data or processes. The software that controls the
handshaking must require proper data and must log all access
attempts
.
90. Operating System Identification of Terminals
All teirminal activity should be controlled by the operating
system, which should be able to identify terminals, whether
they are hardwired or connected through communications
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lines. A chart should be created for use in identifying and
locating terminals according to their IDs.
The operating system should inspect log-on requests to
determine which application the terminal user desires. The
user should identify an existing application and supply a
valid user ID and password combination (see Countermeasure
119) . If the log-on request is valid, the operating system
should make a logical connection between the user and the
application.
91. Operating System Control of Data Transfer
Maintain positive control of all data transfers between
files and logical devices through the operating system.
Performing error and parity checking on each fetch and
transfer cycle prevents the injection of malicious or
inadvertent errors into the system during data transfer.
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Operating System Control of Resource Allocation
The operating system dispatcher should control processor
allocation, using a priority queue determined by the users
and the installation's established policy. As each task is
dispatched, a control register should be loaded with the
address of the task's unique address translation table. The
control register should not be accessible by the user
program, and the tables should be retained in storage areas
that are not among the user program's read/write/execute
capabilities.
93. Operating System Control of Maintenance Software
The operating system should permit access/execution of
utility software only in the system state or privileged
mode. This feature protects against covert modification of
software. Special care should take in the control of utili-
ties such as SUPERZAP, with all accesses and/or uses logged
and reported.
94. Operating System Control of Executive Mode
Access/Execution
The operating system should have the capability to create
two modes or states for processor operation: supervisor and
user states, which operate in privileged and unprivileged
modes, respectively. Certain processor instructions are
designated privileged and can be executed only when the
processor is operating in the privileged state. Privileged
instructions, for example, are those that:
• Perform input/output
• Control the interrupt mechanism
• Set base and bounds registers or locks and keys
User programs execute with the processor in unprivileged
mode, and any attempt to execute a privileged instruction is





95. Operating System Erasure/Purge of Residual Data
The operating system should have the capability (by over-
write, dump restore, or the like) to erase or purge residual
data. This should be performed on all main memory locations
and peripheral storage after completion of classified or
sensitive processing and before reallocation of system
resources to another user.
96. Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM)
The VMM, the central control program in a virtual machine
system, supports an extended machine on which user programs
can be run. Since the VMM can support programs that use the
full capability of a computer system, it can support
complete operating systems in the same way that operating
systems support user programs. Therefore, it is possible to
run two incompatible operating systems on a single computer
at the same time or to run one operating system in produc-
tion mode while system programmers simultaneously modify
another active copy of that operating system. The VMM
effectively operates as an isolation mechanism.
97. Job Management
The principal job management functions of the operating
system should be provided by a job entry subsystem, through
which all jobs, started tasks, and time-sharing log-on
requests should enter the system. The job management func-
tion performs the following basic tasks:
• Reading jobs into the system
• Scheduling jobs for execution
• Maintaining all data submitted with jobs
• Supporting the system management facilities
• Handling output from jobs and time-sharing users
98. Job Scheduling
The operating system should provide job scheduling functions
consistent with a secure processing environment. Input an
output data streams should be handled in a manner that
restricts access to the associated job through the use of
dynamically allocated spool space (see Countermeasure 99)
.
99. Job Spooling
The operating system should provide the spooling function
for input and output data streams. It should follow naming
conventions for spooled data sets that guarantee restricted
access (e.g., input data sets can be accessed only b the job
that created them) . Similarly, spooled output should auto-
matically be associated with the creating job.
100. Interrupt Handlers
Operating system interrupt-handling programs should support
hardware features that supplement the security feature of
the task management functions. In addition to detecting
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external signals for service and normal completion of I/O
requests, the interrupt mechanism should recognize the
following potential security violations:
• Attempts to execute undefined instruction code
• Attempts by programs executing in user (unprivi-
leged) mode to execute privileged instructions
• Attempts to reference unallocated storage addresses
• Attempts to exceed current capabilities when refer-
encing allocated storage (e.g., attempts to write
in read-only areas)
• Attempts to reference main storage allocated to
other user jobs or any of the various operating
system functions
• Attempts to issue invalid commands to storage
devices
After the attempted operation has been aborted by the hard-
ware, the interrupt handler should routinely terminate the
user program.
101. Recovery Management
Recovery management facilities should handle error proces-
sing for both hardware and software failures, so that system
processing can continue with minimal downtime.
• Software failure recovery—The recovery facility
should monitor the flow of software recovery
processing by handling all abnormal terminations of
tasks and address spaces and passing control to
recovery routines associated with the terminating
functions.
• Hardware failure recovery—The operating system
should have the capability to gather information
about hardware reliability and allow the user to
retry operations that failed because of processor,
I/O device, or channel errors. This feature should
be designed to keep the system operational in the
event of hardware failures.
102. Indirect Addressing
All addresses passed between the system and the user should
be logical in nature rather than real, protecting memory
address locations of classified or sensitive data.
103 . Paging
The paging supervision routines of the operating system
should be responsible for transferring individual page con-
tents and swapping complete user page sets between main and
secondary storage. Tables that provide a directory to the
contents of each available page on the direct-access data
sets should be accessible only by executive-mode routines.
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104. Data Base Access Controls
Data base access controls should be provided at the user,
data, and process levels. Loggings of all accesses and
attempted accesses should be available, and the DBMS should
provide concurrent access controls and deadlock resolution.
105. Data Dictionary Controls
Certain data dictionary features enhance security in the
data base; these features include:
• Level of integration—A highly integrated data
dictionary requires greater security measures.
Develop procedures to prevent misuse of the addi-
tional capabilities integration offers.
• Access control—The data dictionary should have
access controls to prevent any unauthorized use or
modification.
• Backup—Establish procedures for keeping a current
certified copy of the data dictionary.
• Certification/veriflability—Establish procedures
for certification and verification of backup as
well as production copies of the data dictionary.
• Program registration—The data dictionary should
have a program registration capability to prevent
unauthorized access or use.
106. Data Base Recovery
Provide the capability for rapid and efficient data base
recovery, including:
• Backup—Utilities, programs, and procedures should
be available to provide backup for the data base.
• Up-to-date copies—Current copies of all essential
program files and the like should be kept available
and secure.
• Documentation—Recovery and backup procedure docu-
mentation should be kept current.
• Levels of recovery—Provisions for selective
recovery and definitions of acceptable degradation
of service should be specified.
107 . Data Base Maintenance
Adequate facilities and procedures for data base maintenance
are essential for data base security. These include:
• Vendor interface—Vendor maintenance procedures
should be established to ensure that security is
not compromised.
• Ease of maintenance—Easy-to-maintain modules and
well-defined software maintenance procedures are
essential: lack of proper maintenance can cause
security breaches.
• Maintenance responsibility—Clearly define mainte-




for the evaluation and certification of the DBMS,
and keep a certified audit copy as backup. Docu-
mentation relating to the DBMS should be kept




Limitation of Log-on Attempts
Limit system log-on attempts from remote terminal devices.
More than two unsuccessful attempts should result in
teirmination of the session, generation of an audit entry
and/or operator message, and purging of the input queue of
messages from that terminal.
109. Passwords
Use passwords that require the user to enter a string of
characters that are checked by the system against a system-
resident password file. Access is granted or denied
accordingly. Current password schemes include:
• Simple or fixed passwords--In this scheme, the user
selects a fixed-length character string and stores
it in the file prior to use. This system is
inexpensive, it uses an easy-to-remember password,
and it remains valid until changed by the user.
However, user-generated passwords are frequently
obvious (e.g., user's name, spouse's name) and are
thus easily penetrated.
• Changeable (one-time) passwords—This scheme
increases the integrity of a simple password by
providing the user with a given list of passwords.
The same list is stored in the computer in encrypt-
ed form. The user selects the first password on
the list, which matches the first password stored
on the system-resident table. The user then
crosses that password off the list. Similarly, the
system will not honor that password for subsequent
requests, whether or not the user is authorized.
Changeable passwords can also be used to authenti-
cate the computer's log-off acknowledgement as well
as the user's logoff request.
• Random passwords—In this technique, the user is
supplied with a pseudo-random number at log-on, and
transforms it algebraically, using a transform
previously provided by the system. The system per-
forms the same transformation instantly and
compares the answers. Although a hostile
individual may intercept the argument of the
function or the answer transmitted to the computer,
he or she does not know the nature of the transfor-
mation and its thus denied access to the system.
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• Functional passwords—Multilevel protection codes
stored within each user's password determine the
user's level of access to specified processor func-
tions and data sets.
110. Terminal Password Suppression
Use a nonprinting, password-suppression feature on all
terminals to prevent the display of a user ID or password at
log-on.
111. Process Lockout
Develop controls to restrict critical transactions to
specific time periods such as normal working hours and
prohibit their generation at any other time. Terminals used
to process restricted transactions and critical files can be
locked out physically and/or through system software
controls (see also Countermeasures 85 and 116)
.
112. Control of Dial-up Mode
Use the following controls for dial-up networks:
• Maintain the confidentiality of dial-up telephone
numbers and change them at regular intervals.




Restrict access of dial-up terminals to particular port(s)
or front-end communications processors by equipping dial-up
terminals with an identification chip that will generate a
hardware identifier signal. This signal allows the communi-
cations processor to recognize the terminal as a dial-up and
to route its messages to the designated port or processor
(see also Countermeasure 124)
.
114 Communications Link Encryption
Use cryptographic devices to encrypt sensitive data trans-
missions. At the receiving end, a compatible device
decrypts the communication. Monitoring encrypted communi-
cations thus yields an interloper only unintelligible text.
Encryption also provides an additional source of message
error checking, since any error occurring during trans-
mission results in a change in the bit structure, causing
the message to fail decryption.
115. Security Network Front Ends (NFE)
Using a minicomputer as an NFE provides surveillance and
auditability between nodes in a network as well as protec-
tion between terminals and host processors at the nodes.
The NFE can perform the same type of monitoring functions at
the network level as those that are performed by the hard-
ward monitor at the system level (e.g., transaction logging,
access validation, surveillance, audit trail) . This
monitoring can provide a real-time profile of network use
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and performance, permitting identification and isolation of
problems before a serious compromise occurs. The NFE
operates mostly logically, either as a component of the net-
work control/management system or co-located with it in the
network control center.
116. Hardware Terminal Locking
In areas that are not physically secured, equip terminals
with locking devices to prevent their use during unattended
periods. The locks should be installed in addition to pro-
grammed restrictions, such as automatic disconnect after a





These are challenge/response techniques between the user and
the system, such as:
• Extended handshake—To gain admittance to the
system, the user must first satisfy a sequential
decision procedure based on user-specific input
parameters (e.g., user ID, password). This
mechanism can restrict a terminal or user to
certain physical locations, time periods, data
sets, functions, or other attributes.
• Question and answer—This technique is based on
system-resident tables of standard and user-
supplied questions and answers. When a user
attempts to log-on, some or all of these questions,
chosen at random, are asked by the operating
system. The user must answer all the questions
correctly in order to be granted access.
118. Fiber Optic Cable
Use fiber optic cable to prevent physical wiretapping.
Because fiber optics use light as the transmission medium,
any break in the integrity of the cable (such as that
created by a wiretap) will destroy the cable's conductivity,
rendering monitoring impossible.
119. Shielded Cable
Use cable (e.g., coaxial cable) shielded to prevent electro-
magnetic radiation and designed so that any attempt to tap
will result in destruction of the circuit and/or activation
of alarm sensors.
120. Message Authentication Standard
Use the ANSIX9.E8 Message Authentication Standard[6] to
authenticate messages, detect attempts at message modifica-




Use polynomial error checking to detect errors in message
blocks. This method uses a mathematical algorithm to check
the structure and composition of bits transmitted against
bits received: All the one bits in a message block are
counted and divided by a prime number. The remainder (of
this division) is transmitted with the message; the receiver
performs the same calculation and matches the remainders.
If the remainders match, the message has been received as
sent. Attempts to tamper with the message as well as acci-
dental changes caused by line noise and other nonmalicious
factors can be detected.
All errors should generate an error message at the receiving
end; each message should be accompanied by a description of
corrective action to be taken by the operator. An
explanation of all error messages should be contained in a
user manual to be available at the network control center
(NCC)
.
122. Message Parity Checking
Use both vertical and horizontal parity checking on all
incoming messages. This is particularly important in asyn-
chronous communications (e.g., TTY) , since no time base
common to sender and receiver is present (as it is in syn-
chronous transmission) . An 8th bit is added to the 7-bit
ASCII coding structure. This bit, based solely on the value
of the other 7 bits, is used to detect any change in the
message during transmission. The technigue is extremely
useful in detecting both inadvertent and malicious changes
in message content and structure.
123. Physical Security of Communications Appearances
Provide adequate physical security for all communications
appearances (e.g. , telephone cable rooms, cable runs) where
physical wiretapping is possible. Measures to be taken
include:
• Enclosure of all communications appearances in
areas that can be locked and physically secured.
• Installation of cipher locks or magnetic key card
devices on doors leading to wiring rooms or
closets.
• Installation of magnetic contact alarms and motion
detectors in areas that are not subject to 24-hour
human surveillance.
Provide all modems, multiplexors, and patch panels with ade-
quate physical security, including:
• Limitation of access to authorized personnel only
• Placement of modems, multiplexors, and other equip-
ment in areas such as the network control center
where they can be under 2 0-hour surveillance
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• In remote equipment areas, CCTV coverage and
installation of electronic intrusion detection
systems
See also Countermeasures 1, 2, and 12.
124. Hardware Terminal Identifier
Fit all terminals using dedicated lines with a hardware
identifier chip that so identifies the terminal to the sys-
tem. This will allow controls to be developed to restrict
access by user function and data as well as message origin
(see also Countermeasure 113)
.
125. ACK/NAK
Use ACK/NAK for all messages. These characters indicate
that the previous transmission was successfully received
(ACK) . If no previous message has been received, whether
lost in transmission or simply not sent, the characters
indicate a negative acknowledgement (NAK)>
126. Safe Storage of Messages
Safe-store all incoming/outgoing message traffic to protect
against power or equipment failure or power surges or
spikes.
127. Dynamic Polling Reconfiguration
Use dynamic reconfiguration of polling lists to restrict
access by certain terminals during certain periods (see also
Countermeasures 85, 111, and 116)
.
128. Automatic Answering/Automatic Outdialing
Use programmable front ends, concentrators, or modems for




Use a pseudo-duplex (which appears like a four-wire circuit)
or a two-wire multiplexed circuit to maintain continuous
carrier wave and increase transmission efficiency and
reliability.
130. Line Backup
Have an automatic or manual dial-up line capability as
backup for dedicated lines. Such facilities should allow
outdialing only.
131. Modems with Automatic Equalization
Use modems with automatic equalization and balancing to
compensate for line distortion, thus reducing line error and
decreasing the need for conditioned lines.
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132. Network Controllers/Network Management Systems
Eliminate the need for remote site test personnel by using
automated remote monitoring systems that provide a central
operator with all pertinent network status information.
These systems, which can supervise large multiple-point and
distributed processing networks, are designed around a
master controller at the network control center. The
controller is connected to special modules in each modem in
the network that monitor the performance of their associated
modems, collect status data, and respond to commands from
the central controller. The central-site operator diagnoses
faults in the network and initiates corrective action. Some
of these systems are also equipped with a network management
capability that provides statistical and trend reporting on
network operation.
Such reporting is particularly important when:
• Central controllers change the polling configura-
tion or in some way alter the manner in which
terminals access the network, especially if:
—The controller alters the time during which
terminal (s) are granted access.
—The controller alters rules that mediate the
access of certain terminals or groups of terminals
to the various processors, programs, or data
accessed by the network.
• The central controller is used to establish both
virtual and physical links between processor nodes
in the network; that is, it establishes a circuit
between one host processor and a terminal user of
another host processor in the network.
133. Modems and Automatic Redialing
Use modems with automatic redialing capability to minimize
downtime from line dropout. These modems should be avail-
able at the host processor only. Providing automatic
redialing at a remote dial-up node might allow an interloper
to cause a line dropout, followed by redialing of the host
processor. Since the host would simply be reestablishing an
existing connection, the safety feature of outdialing would
not be used.
134. Multispeed Modems
Use modems with a multispeed capability (generally 300 to
9,600 bits per second). Lower speeds can be used when line
error rates are high or when a larger number of slower
circuits is desired, such as for online data entry or ter-
minal inquiry. Higher speeds can then be used when line
error rates are low and higher-speed transmission is more
efficient, such as for bulk data transfer.
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135. Packet-Switched Networks
Use packet-switched networks for both security and relia-
bility. These networks divide all messages into packets and
route them over different communications paths. This
technique provides a higher level of reliability and makes
message interception significantly more difficult.
136. Communications Hardware Backup








137. Digital Radio Backup
In the event of total communication failure, patch slow-
speed digital output through HF/VHF/UHF radio links.
138. Communications Software Backup
Maintain up-to-date backup copies of all communications
software for use in the event of destruction or failure of
the primary system. Storage should be on a secure off-site
location.
PROCEDURAL SECURITY CONTROLS
139. Review Access and Transaction Authority
Establish a program for the regular review of user access
privilege and transaction authority. Ensure that the
authorizations are still necessary for user function and are
restricted to the smallest number of people consistent with
operational effectiveness.
140. Verification of Transaction Authorization
Establish a control function to verify independently the
authorization of transactions before giving transaction
documents to terminal operators for data input by having a
verification clerk check the signature or query the
authorizer by phone.
141. Input Format Aids
Use such input format aids as menus and data input masks to
speed data entry and reduce operator input error, especially
for financial and other sensitive transactions.
142. Output Report Identification






• Sensitivity level of report
• Disposal and control procedures (e.g., return to
document control for destruction)
.
143. Suspended-Item Reconciliation
Ensure that all suspended transactions such as input errors
are reconciled, either manually or through the program, at
the end of each processing day or cycle.
144. Batch-Size Control
Limit size of input batches (e.g., no more than 50 source
documents) for maximum control and facilitated reconcilia-
tion and batch verification.
145. Cross-Reference Field
Use the source document number as part of the transaction
number to provide a cross-reference and an audit trail to
allow tracing transactions to the source document that
created them.
146. Correction Procedures
Clearly define procedures to be used in correcting input
errors, delineating:
• The types and classes of errors that occur
• Correction procedures for error processing
• Authorization and verification procedures for
generating a corrected transaction
• Logging procedures for corrected transactions
• Re-input/recycling procedures
• Balancing procedures for corrected output totals.
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Date/Time Stamping of Source Documents
Date/time-stamp all source documents at the time of data
entry to prevent multiple entries of the same transaction.
Time-stamp all input transactions to avoid confusion with
multiple transactions from the same source or those with
similar or repetitive information.
148. Source-Data Capture
Use source-data-capture techniques that minimize both the
creation and manual processing of paper transactions and
opportunities for error. Methods to be considered include:
• Optical character recognition
• MICR coding
• Bar coding
• Terminal data capture at the point of origin.
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149. Verification of Input Data
Ensure that critical data is verified for accuracy before
being released for processing. This verification should be
done by an operator other than the one who made the initial
input, and is generally accomplished by:
• Key verification of card-input data, using indepen-
dent keying of data from a source document.
• Calling up a transaction for display on a CRT,
using a transaction number or other unique identi-
fier. The verification operator then rekeys the
transaction (or certain sensitive data elements)
from the source document to make sure that there is
a match.
150. Transaction Identification
Assign a unique transaction code to each transaction entered
into the system.
151. Run-to-Run Totals
Use run-to-run totals for unit and aggregate reconciliation
after each run to help prevent loss of or tampering with
data between runs. Totals from each batch can be reconciled
manually with the machine-generated total for the run. All
out-of-balance conditions should be logged, and corrective




Establish a central control function responsible for all
verification, error correction, re-input, and reconcilia-
tion. This function should be independent of the data entry
function.
153. Memo-Posting System
Use memo posting for sensitive online data-capture opera-
tions. The transactions are entered online during the
processing day and are batched in a transaction file. At
intervals during the processing day, source documents (e.g.,
checks, invoices) are again input (using MICR, OCR, or the
like) . The two files are reconciled, and only the online
transactions that match corresponding source documents are
written to a live production data file.
154. Front-End Editing of Input
Use intelligent terminals for editing at the point of data
capture. This reduces overhead on the mainframe and pro-
vides an initial level of system control. Edits that might
be performed at this level include:
• Testing limits to determine whether entered values
exceed predefined nominals
• Consistency checking between input data fields
• Completeness checking to ascertain that all neces-
sary data for transaction processing has been input
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• Transaction-date comparison with system clock
• Comparison between user ID/terminal ID and allowed
transaction codes to ensure that the input is an
authorized transaction.
155. Restricted Inputed Points
Develop both physical and programmed restrictions on termin-
als that process critical transactions or capture critical
data (see also Countermeasures 85, 111, and 116).
156. Controlled Access to Critical Source Documents
Restrict and control access to sensitive source documents
(e.g., receiving reports, vouchers, checks). Control
sensitive documents with serially numbered forms.
157. Physical Control of Output
Ensure that all system output is properly controlled;
controls should include the following:
• Keep all human-readable output in a physically
secured area.
• Have users sign for all output received from the
data center.
• Produce only enough copies to meet operational
needs. Periodically review user output report
requirements to ensure that excess copies or
unnecessary reports are not being created.
• Reconcile actual output production with the output
volume reported by the program (page-count
routines)
.
• Destroy carbon paper after running sensitive
output
.
• Mark sensitive output appropriately.




Provide backup or redundant hardware for critical system
components such as CPUs, disk drives, tape drives, printers,
COM units, and CRTs. These should be regularly inspected,
maintained, and tested.
159 Critical Software Backup
Maintain off-site backup copies of current critical system





160. Software Modification Control
All system or application software changes should be imple-
mented and tested on a developmental or target disk pack.
After certification, this pack should be given to operators
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for loading of the production system. Changes should never
be made directly to a production system, and programmers
should never move the change from development to production.
Emergency patches made at times other than those designated
for change implementation must be properly documented and
reviewed by the appropriate authority within 24 hours. No
changes should be made without going through the established
change control/configuration management cycle (see Counter-
measure 72) .
SECURITY MANAGEMENT CONTROLS
161. DP Security Committee
Appoint a DP security committee to coordinate data and com-
munications security requirements. This committee should be
composed of:
• The chief operating officer
• The DP risk manager (see Countermeasure 163)
• The data security officer (see Countermeasure 164)
• The auditor
• The director of data processing
• Representatives of major system users.
This committee, which should have a written charter from the
chief executive officer, should meet regularly.
162. Data Security Manual
Develop formal documentation of all DP and communications
security procedures in the form of a data security manual,
which should contain:
• Statement of security policy
• Organizational security responsibilities
• Data-center physical security procedures
• Online and terminal security procedures
• Security and control considerations in software
development and maintenance
• Security-incident reporting procedures
• Contingency and continuity-of-operations plan,




DP Risk Manager/DP Security Administrator
Appoint a DP risk manager who, to maintain operational inde-
pendence, reports to the individual within the organization
who is responsible for overall risk management planning
(e.g. , corporate risk manager, controller) . This person
should be responsible for:
• Development of overall DP and communications
security policy and standards for the organization.
• Coordination of policy implementation with the DP
organization and system users.
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• Conducting risk analyses of DP and communications
operations and developing an overall program that
integrates all aspects of risk management within
the organization's automated environment,
including:
—Risk reduction and countermeasure implementation
—Risk retention
—Transfer of risk through insurance
• Develop contingency and continuity-of-operations
plans to ensure the maintenance of essential DP and
communications functions in the event of damage to
or destruction of primary system resources.
At the operational level, each major user area should
appoint DP security administrator to be responsible for:
• Developing (under the guidance of the risk manager)
specific security operating procedures to facili-
tate security policy implementation within his or
her area.
• Ensuring compliance with security policies and
procedures within his or her area.
• Working with the risk manager to develop new
policies and practices in response to changing
systems and operational requirements.
164. Data Security Officer
In organizations where, size or other considerations make it
infeasible to appoint a DP risk manager, a data security
officer (DSO) should be appointed. For reasons of opera-
tional independence, the DSO should report outside the DP
organization and should be responsible for:
• Developing DP and communications policy and proce-
dures for all systems and users.
• Ensuring overall compliance with policies and
procedures and assisting users in the resolution of
security-related problems.
• Conducting risk analyses of existing and proposed
systems and developing appropriate security and
control postures for these systems.
• Reviewing all modifications to critical and/or
sensitive systems to ensure that proper security
and control has been maintained.
• Developing contingency and continuity-of-operations
plans.
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APPENDIX K
CONTROLS APPLICABILITY BY SENSITIVITY/CRITICALNESS LEVEL
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Security-related laws and regulations information
Top management security needs and concerns information
IS objectives and measures of performance information
Identified and defined IS users information
Users' security needs and concerns information
IS components (tasks) information
IS configuration information
IS plans information
Applications under development information
Existing IS applications information
IS security-related policy statements, standards, rules,
procedures and guidelines information
Results of audits and inspections information
History of security violations and problems information










Security budgetary and staff information
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